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”But over time, we have seen that they weigh in the EU aspect more and more in each 
decision. […] It is the daily procedure that matters, […] that forms a common mind-set and 
reflection. It is a new culture that is developing […] And this effect, I believe that it is a more 
important factor than the treaty itself, that and the day-to-day personal contact.” 
 
- EU official (interviewee n° 3) 
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Abstract!
The European Union has increasingly engaged in formulating a common foreign policy, an 
aim that has been reinforced through the Lisbon Treaty and the European Security Strategy of 
2003. The EU puts considerable effort into coordinating the member states’ positions also in 
other international fora in order to “speak with one voice” on all occasions. EU internal rules 
stipulate that the EU should formulate a common position and express it together in and 
through international multilateral organisations.  
 
This thesis will explore the EU’s foreign policy at the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
during the on-going Ukraine crisis. The crisis has been vividly debated both in the public and 
academic sphere. Previous research on inter-organisational relations has been largely 
concentrated on the EU’s relations with the UN. However, the latter has not had a prominent 
role in the current Ukraine crisis. Instead, European organisations have distinguished 
themselves, notably the OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
 
The EU is represented in these organisations both through their member States and through 
the European External Action Service, a feature that could be beneficial for coordination but 
also ambiguous and at worst even contra-productive when the EU wants to “speak with one 
voice”. Drawing on sociological role theory concepts, this thesis aims to explore how the EU 
has acted in these organisations during the crisis. It will argue that while the EU delegation 
has taken a strong role at the OSCE in speaking for and representing the EU member states 
(top-down Europeanization), the EU at the Council of Europe is still characterized by a high 
degree of bottom-up policies and lower role acceptance by the member states, which could be 
explained by a lack of (formal and informal) institutionalization of the EU delegation’s role in 
Strasbourg. Recent developed during the Ukraine crisis indicates however a trend towards 
top-down leadership. 
 !
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Abbreviations,!
 
Abbreviation Meaning Organisation 
CoE Council of Europe Council of Europe 
CM Committee of Ministers (decision-making body) Council of Europe 
COMM/Commission European Commission EU 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
but also European Court of Human Rights 
Council of Europe 
EEAS European External Action Service EU 
EU European Union  EU 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE 
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Council of Europe 
PC Permanent Council (decision-making body) OSCE 
TEU Treaty of the European Union EU 
TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union EU 
UN United Nations UN 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly UN 
!
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1.#Introduction!!
The rhetorical question supposedly pronounced by the American former secretary of state 
Henry Kissinger has become classic: “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” It has been 
quoted many times when addressing the complex political landscape of the European Union 
(EU). When Catherine Ashton was appointed the first High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, some claimed that the issue was solved.1 But the High 
Representative along with other inventions following the Lisbon Treaty such as the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) have not come without challenges. More recent sociological 
institutionalist work has been arguing that this is due to the strong connotations of diplomacy 
as a national activity, and that the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the (CFSP) 
EEAS are not only challenging the member States in terms of realist concepts of power, but 
also in symbolic terms.2 
 
The political events in Ukraine that erupted in 2013, including mass protests (Euromaidan), 
the ousting of president Yanukovych, the referendum in the Crimean peninsula and the 
clashes with the Russian Federation, have been argued to be the most important security crisis 
in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union.3 Conveniently, Kissinger has expressed his 
opinion on the matter in a debate article published in the Washington Post, where he makes a 
strong voice in the political debate arguing that “[f]ar too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as 
a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West”.4 This jargon has been echoed 
through the academic debate as well, where focus has been on the EU’s relationship with 
Ukraine and Russia respectively, on potential trade benefits for the partners and who to blame 
for the conflict. 5 Surprisingly little attention has been paid to two aspects: firstly to frame the 
Ukraine crisis as an EU foreign policy issue; secondly, to address other relevant international 
organisations in the crisis, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Council of Europe. Both these organisations have been involved to a 
different extent in the crisis; the OSCE’s response to the crisis has ranged from high-level 
                                                
1"See"e.g."Reuters"2009/11/20."
2"See"for"example"Adler/Nissen"(2013)."
3"MacFarlane"&"Menon"(2014)"p."95."
4"Kissinger"(2014)."
5"See"for"example"the"”Faulty"Powers”"article"series"of"”Mearsheimer"and"His"Critics”,"published"in"
Foreign(Affairs(in"the"November/December"print"2014."
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diplomacy and multilateral dialogue to monitoring, fact-finding and military visits. The 
Council of Europe has assisted with measures such as: an International Advisory Panel to 
promote confidence through an independent investigation of acts of violence; assistance by 
the Venice Commission regarding Constitution reform; assistance to the preparations of 
presidential elections in May 2014, and much more.6 Maybe most important to emphasize is 
that the Russian Federation and Ukraine are members of both organisations, giving unique 
opportunities to discuss the crisis with relevant partners in a European context. The question 
that arises from an EU perspective is how the EU has been carrying out their common foreign 
policy in this context. The insight in how the EU acts within these organisations is minimal 
and has hardly been treated at all in previous research. Since these organisations have become 
an important interface towards important actors in the crisis, it is interesting to see how the 
EU has acted within these organisations. 
 
The European Security Strategy from 2003 states that the EU’s external actions should be 
based on effective multilateralism. The member states are “obliged to coordinate their action 
in international organizations and at international conferences”.7 The EU foreign policy has 
been further re-enforced by the Lisbon Treaty, aiming to create a common foreign policy. 
Although foreign policy remains member state competence, the member states are thereby 
forced to coordinate, creating somewhat of a hybrid policy area.8 Extensive literature has 
dealt with the EU’s capability to act jointly and coordinate within especially the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA).9 It points to a more general problem with 
competing membership obligations between two organisations, where on the one hand the EU 
has agreed to act jointly and on the other hand it enters an arena that has a strong tradition of 
national representation. Naturally, this can cause conflicts of interests for the member States. 
Previous research points, however, to an increasingly coherent position between the EU28. 
1.1 Research!aim!
This thesis aims to explore the EU’s “actorness” within the Council of Europe and the OSCE 
in regards to the Ukrainian crisis. This single research question entails several questions of 
how the EU acts in these organisations; the dynamics between the member state 
representations and the EU delegation; the role of the EU delegation; do the member states act 
                                                
6"CoE"webpage"2;"See"CoE"webpage"1"for"a"thorough"list"of"CoE"action"in"Ukraine."
7"TEU,"Article"34.;"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al"(2013),"p."18."
8"See"for"example"Wong"in"Hill"and"Smith"(2011);"Adelssen/Nisser"(2013)."
9"See"for"example"Verlin"Laatikainen"and"Smith"(2006);"Jorgensen"&"Verlin/Laatikainen"(2013)."
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mainly through the EU or do they prefer to act on their own? The study will investigate and 
explore role perceptions and role prescriptions, arguing that it is gives an in-depth knowledge 
to a research problem previously under-explored. The research aim will be further 
problematized and operationalized in the following sections. 
1.2!Outline!of!the!thesis!
The thesis has been outlined in order to define the research problem and find relevant tools to 
answer to it. It starts with a literature review, leading to more precise research questions at the 
end of chapter 2. We will see that there is little theorization on the EU’s actorness in 
multilateral fora, and the existing research tend to be mostly of empiric nature. Furthermore, it 
does not account for the recent innovations stemming from the Lisbon Treaty, such as the 
EEAS. Instead, the study look to more recent work on the EU as a foreign policy actor, 
drawing from sociological institutionalism and role theory, in order to see if we can detect a 
Europeanization effect on the EU foreign policy at the Council of Europe and the OSCE. It 
will be argued that due to the nature of participation of the EU in these organizations and a 
lack of documents in this regard, the most appropriate way to explore this previously under-
researched area as a first step is to conduct interviews. In the analysis chapter, the material 
retrieved from the interviews will be discussed thematically in order to answer to the research 
questions and to line out themes that appeared during the interview. Finally, the results will be 
discussed further in the concluding chapter, where I will try to relate the results to theory and 
to answer to the research questions. 
 !
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2.#Literature&review!
The European Security Strategy from 2003 states that the EU’s external actions should be 
based on effective multilateralism. The member states are “obliged to coordinate their action 
in international organizations and at international conferences”. 10  The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union asserts that “[t]he Union shall establish all appropriate 
forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the 
Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.“11  The member States have 
agreed to cooperate and coordinate their policy within these multilateral organisations. With 
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been 
reinforced and new inventions such as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have been put 
in place in order to enhance coordination and the ability to speak with one voice. Thereby, the 
issue of common representation could in theory be said to have been solved. In multilateral 
relations, however, this raise several issues such as the future legal status of the EU in 
multilateral organisations, the internal coordination and the external representation in these 
fora, and the role of the new European diplomatic service of EEAS in these aspects.12 
 
Previous research on the EU’s relations with international organisations has been described as 
“more scattered and compartmentalised than comprehensive, systematic and integrated”.13 It 
has focused on the relationship with the UN and often has it been of an empiric nature, 
exploring voting behaviour of the member States at the UNGA. The focus has been on 
coordination and the ability to coordinate positions, and often the mere existence of a 
common output has been interpreted as a sign of efficiency. However, as the EU institutional 
landscape has evolved, so has the research on the EU as an international actor. The EU has 
been seen as, at the one end of the spectrum, “a potential state, or at least the performer of 
essential state functions in the international political arena.” At the other end are “those who 
see the EU as at best a patchy and fragmented international participant, and as little more than 
                                                
10"TEU,"Article"34.;"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al"(2013),"p."18."
11"TFEU,"220"(Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al"(2013),"p."19."
12"Verlin"Laatikainen"(2010)"p."476."
13"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013)"p."15.!"
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a system of regular diplomatic co-ordination between member states.”14 This study will argue 
that the EU is a complex, hybrid actor that needs another set of tools to analyse. It continues 
on a new stream of research on the EU as an international actor, that assumes a link between 
role and identity theories with EU external action. Roles, in this understanding, refer to 
patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour, a concept that can be linked to neo-institutional 
theory and its emphasis on ”logic of appropriateness”. 15  It will be argued that these 
conceptual analytical tools can be useful to analyse the EU’s external action at the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe, and that a good way to start exploring this phenomenon is by simply 
asking EU and national officials. This approach will also move away from a mere bottom-up 
perspective, which constitutes a risk when only measuring voting behaviour.16 
2.1!The!EU!as!an!international!actor!
The EU as an international actor has been researched from the perspective of broader 
international relations, in the realms of foreign policy analysis and analysis of identity and 
order. There are some main dividing lines in the literature. Firstly, there are those who 
underline the distinctiveness of the European Union, as opposed to those that have tried to put 
it into a broader international relation’s perspective.17 The notion of multilateralism has been 
present in the debate. Despite formulated goals in the European Security strategy and the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU as a multilateral actor is sometimes criticized for lacking a “grand 
strategy”,18 leaving its aims and goals in the international arena up for debate. The explicit 
goal of effective multilateralism, as mentioned above, is interpreted by some as a goal in 
itself, whereas others argue that it is an “instrumental mean to pursue specific policy 
objectives related to distinctive EU or member-states’ interests’”.19 This illustrates the second 
main division in the discussion of the EU as an international actor: is the EU a “normative 
power” or a “normal”/ strategic power?20 A normative power is defined as an actor that 
influences the thinking of other actors in the international system rather than acting through 
coercive means to achieve its goals. It has become common in the academic and political 
discourse to label the EU a normative great power. 21 On the other hand, these concepts are 
                                                
14"Elgström"&"Smith"(2006)"p."1."
15"Elgström"&"Smith"(2006)"p."5."
16"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013)"p."18."
17"Hill"&"Smith"(2011)"p."5."
18"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013)"p."21."
19"Blavoukos"&"Bourantonis"(2011),"p."1."
20"Smith 2011, p. 245."
21"Bengtsson & Elgström 2012, pp. 94-95."
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not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, scholars have argued that the division 
between normative and strategic power might well be a false dichotomy, since the Lisbon 
Treaty makes it clear that the EU is to “assert its interests and values on the international 
scene”.22 There is therefore no contradiction in being an interest-based and a normative 
organisation. 
2.2!Inter9organisational!relations:!coordination,!voting!behaviour!and!increasing!
convergence!
Previous research tends to explore either the level of cohesion of EU members within 
international organisations, or the externally oriented approach looking at cohesion between 
the EU and its partners.23 Furthermore, research is often of an empiric and descriptive nature, 
rather than explanatory. Maria Strömvik explains the problem at hand by the fact that the EU 
often is considered a case sui generis and therefore hard to classify as a case of something. A 
consequence is that many studies of the EU’s relations with other multilateral organisations 
are of empiric nature.24 Another striking feature is the strong focus on the relations with the 
UN. This is hardly surprising, since the EU and the UN were some of the first organisations 
that had to relate to each other in such a comprehensive way.25 In inter-organisational 
relations, there is always an element of competition between the two organisations, especially 
when competences over-lap. The EU and the UN, on the contrary, have developed an 
extensive coordination network and has been characterized as ‘natural partners’ in 
multilateralism, since they “mirror each other’s values and precepts”.26  The EU has for a long 
time worked to express a common position in the UN and to coordinate the member states’ 
positions primarily in the General Assembly. Some scholars argue that this has been a way for 
the EU to construct an internal identity through external issues.27  
 
Studies have typically focused on voting behaviour and many have shown a general 
convergence in the UN General Assembly. 28  Furthermore, previous research has also 
investigated the EU’s capacity to export norms. Simon Duke (2012) explores for example 
whether the EU’s multilateral roles really lead to ‘effective multilateralism’ or ‘good 
                                                
22"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013)"p."21;"TEU,"Article"21,"emphasis"added."
23"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013)"p."21"
24"Strömvik"(2005),"p."9."
25"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013),"pp"15/16."
26"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013),"pp"15/16."
27"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013),"pp."16/17;"Deudney"and"Maull"(2011),"p."117."
28"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013),"p."17;"Rasch"(2008),"pp."220/53."
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governance’ in the case of the UN. The conclusion is ambiguous – on the one hand, the EU-
UN multilateral relation is the most successful example, but on the other hand, the EU is 
being challenged internally at the same time as the global institutional landscape is changing 
towards less structured ad hoc working groups.29  
 
Hardly surprising, the EU is shown to be most cohesive when it has exclusive competences 
and less cohesive when it comes to foreign or security policies. This is true even in the cases 
where the EU has formulated a common position in Brussels, due to competing national 
interests and the intergovernmental nature of the policy area.30 Verlin Laatikainen and Smith 
(2006) give a more nuanced picture, saying that although there is a clear link between the EU 
internal decision-making structures and its effectiveness in other multinational fora, the link is 
not as neat as you would think. For example, in areas where the competence is shared 
between the member States and the EU, such as environment, the EU has overcome these 
challenges and still manages to coordinate efficiently. This is much due to a strong position of 
the Commission that takes on a coordinating role.31 
2.2.1!Concepts!of!Europeanization!and!effectiveness!in!EU!multilateralism!
Europeanization is a fashionable word commonly used for describing the process of policy 
convergence over time. It is used both as a constraining, independent variable, where the EU 
imposes policy orientations on national governments and as a variable dependent on the roles 
played by the member states.32 Reuben Wong identifies five types of Europeanization 
processes commonly used in the literature on EU foreign policy: 1) A top down process of 
national adaption to the EU position and thereby policy convergence; 2) A bottom-up national 
projection of ideas to the supranational level, where the more powerful member states can be 
expected to project their ideas to the common position; the multidirectional processes of 3) 
socialization (convergence of interests and creating of a common identity); 4) 
“modernization” of ideas (often applied to the new economic and political adaption of 
accession countries after 2004 to the EU policy) and 5) the policy isomorphism, 
distinguishing between direct Europeanization where competence within a policy area is 
transferred to the EU level and indirect Europeanization where the competence is shared or 
lays with the member states, but there is a process of policy learning between the member 
                                                
29"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013)"pp."16"/"24."
30"Duke"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013),"p."17."
31"Verlin"Laatikainen"&"Smith"(2006)"pp."16/17."
32"Wong"in"&"Smith"(ed)"(2011),"pp."150,"151.""
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states. It is worth noticing that these concepts are not mutually exclusive but share certain 
overlapping assumptions. 33 Foreign policy is traditionally a member state-owned policy area, 
but has become somewhat of a hybrid after the Lisbon treaty and the installation of the EEAS, 
according to which the EU member states should have a common foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the member states are obliged to coordinate their actions in other multilateral 
fora.34 When exploring the issue at hand, we would explore an indirect Europeanization effect 
(since it is member state competence), with the possibility to explore both bottom-up and top-
down streams seen not only as policy effect but also as a socialization process.  
 
In the multilateral relations context, Verlin Laatikainen and Smith (2006) has studied whether 
we can see a Europeanization effect on the EU’s foreign policy at the UN.35 They employ the 
concept of Europeanization as the institutional (development of) capability to coordinate 
actions, adaption by individual member states to the EU position and the external diffusion 
process of European ideas or institutions, i.e. whether these are reflected in the UN.36 They 
are thereby defining Europeanization as a top-down process, where a lack of national adaption 
would mean no Europeanization.  
 
The results indicate an institutional capacity build-up at the UN, where the EU Presidency 
increasingly speaks on the behalf of the EU member states, together with the Commission that 
“raises the EU flag in its areas of competence”. The system of coordination and consultation 
that emerged after the Amsterdam Treaty has also resulted in greater coherence in EU 
positions in the General Assembly. When it comes to national adaption, there is a variation 
between member states where more powerful states (i.e. France, United Kingdom) continue to 
protect their national interests to a larger extent compared to so-called middle powers 
(Netherlands and Nordic countries) and small states (i.e. the newer member states). Naturally, 
France and UK have a very special position at the UN, since they both have permanent seats 
at the Security Council. Middle powers are generally taking the lead in promoting the 
necessity of a common EU position and multilateralism, whereas the small states such as 
“new” member states from Central and Eastern Europe are the most compliant.37 
 
                                                
33"Wong"in"Hill"&"Smith"(ed)"(2011),"pp."150/154,"166/168."
34"European"Security"Strategy"(2003);"TEU,"Article"34."
35"Verlin"Laatikainen"&"Smith"(2006),"p."5."
36"Verlin"Laatikainen"&"Smith"(2006),"pp."5/10."
37"Verlin"Laatikainen"&"Smith"(2006),"pp."13/15."
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Verlin Laatikainen and Smith further explore the effectiveness of the EU in acting on and 
influence certain policy areas, exploring both internal effectiveness (do member states want to 
act collectively at the UN; is there an EU output and cohesion?) and external effectiveness ( 
does the EU manage to influence other actors? Does the EU contribute to the effectiveness of 
the UN? Can the EU “save” the UN?)38 The results of their analysis indicate that the ability of 
EU member states to agree and put forward common statements and positions is clearly 
linked to the EU’s internal decision-making structures and procedures. However, the 
variations are not entirely explained by this structure but vary between and even within policy 
areas. The Commission has taken a prominent role in trying to coordinate MS action, but 
there are few mechanisms for it to act when the member states are divided.39  
 
The study by Verlin Laatikainen and Smith is together with Jorgensen et al (2013) one of the 
most thorough recent works on the EU’s relationship with a multilateral organisations, but 
there are two issues to address. Firstly, it is the issue of Europeanization. The concept used by 
Verlin Laatikainen and Smith explores the existence of top-down Europeanization where 
member states adapt to EU policy. If there were no national adaption, there would be no 
Europeanization effect. This would be a simplistic view and a normative idea of what the EU 
should be,40 since it is easy to imagine for example a scenario where the EU has a high level 
of coherent acting within the OSCE, but the process of policy creation is bottom-up, rather 
than top down. 
 
The second notion has to do with the concept of effectiveness, a concept that runs through the 
literature. The argument, as expressed by Koops (2013), is that inter-organisational 
effectiveness “cannot be reduced merely to the EU’s ability to be effective within another 
organisation (i.e. to be able to ‘speak with one voice’), but more importantly it depends on the 
overall impact the EU is able to generate in a given policy field”.41 There are two elements in 
this sentence. First of all, it demonstrates the problematic approach in trying to assess overall 
effectiveness, whereas the EU’s internal and external effectiveness are two different issues 
(although the second one is dependent on the first one). Secondly, it is true that considering 
mere common output as effectiveness is not enough to capture even the internal aspect. But 
                                                
38"Verlin"Laatikainen"&"Smith"(2006),"pp."5/10."
39"Verlin"Laatikainen"&"Smith"(2006)"pp."16/17."
40"Wong"in"Hill"and"Smith"(ed)"(2011)."
41"Koops"(2013)"in"Jorgensen"&"Verlin"Laatikainen"(ed)"(2013)."
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instead of adding the element of external effectiveness, which is a completely different issue 
requiring a set of completely different tools, this essay will focus on developing and refining 
the instruments to assess the internal aspect of the EU’s actorness in international 
organisations. 
 
Another interesting feature of the study is that the authors link the EU effectiveness to the 
level of Europeanization of common external action, in terms of both institutional 
development and in terms of member states’ acceptance of the EU role. Rightly 
conceptualized, this could add theoretical insights to this study. I will get back to this, after a 
short paragraph on the scarce research available on the EU’s relationship with the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe. 
2.2.2!The!EU’s!relationship!with!the!OSCE!–!functional!convergence!
Although most attention has been paid to the relations with the UN, some scholars have 
explored the EU’s relationship with the OSCE and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe. 
Galbreath and Brosig (2012) have tried to map out the relationship between the three 
organisations. They argue that even if there is a functional and geographical overlap in 
competence between the organisations, the organisations have committed to “the principle of 
complementarity, avoiding duplication”.42 The authors have classified this development as a 
“functional convergence”, which has produced greater cooperation and arguably competition. 
In their interview study, several respondents insist that the over-lap between all three 
organisations is not a problem, since each organisation has its own specific tools to use. The 
problem is rather that some countries use so-called forum shopping, where a state’s 
government talks to one organisation on a particular matter and then decides to move to 
another to pursue this issue. The coordination efforts between the organisations then help 
preventing forum shopping.43 One respondent makes the following distinction between the 
organisations: “[T]he Council of Europe is about standard-setting, it has a legal approach 
while we [the OSCE] have a more political approach”.44  
 
                                                
42"Paunov"(2013)."
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While Galbreath and Brosig’s study serves as an interesting background story in order to map 
the relationship, it does not help us answering the core issue, namely EU as an actor at the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
2.2.3!Lacking!a!comprehensive!and!systematic!approach?!
To sum it up, inter-organisational studies have almost exclusively focused on the relations 
between the EU and the UN. They have often been of empiric nature, measuring voting 
behaviour convergence within the UNGA. Overall, the research indicates an institutional 
build-up in order to coordinate and a convergence of positions. It denotes a difference 
between big and small (and medium) member states in terms of compliance. There is also a 
difference between issues, connected to the policy procedure of the specific issue. Drawing on 
expectations from previous literature, we could expect that our case (as a foreign policy issue) 
is an example of where the EU has difficulties to act cohesively, and that there would be a 
difference in behaviour or attitude between big and small member states. 
 
On a more general note, the key concept in most studies is “efficiency”, although it has been 
operationalized quite differently. In general, most studies have distinguished between internal 
and external efficiency. There are several problems with using any of these approaches in this 
study. First of all, the empiric research on voting behaviour would have no relevance to the 
case at hand, since the main decision-making bodies at the Council of Europe and the OSCE 
are based on a consensus culture.45 Secondly, there seems to be no problematizing of the 
concept of “efficiency”, which almost without exception has been seen as the mere existence 
of common action amongst EU countries, without looking more qualitatively into the 
complex dynamics of the process.46 Questions such as “do member states want to act 
collectively” and “is there an EU output” are relevant aspects of EU effectiveness, but it is not 
enough to capture the dynamics of EU common foreign policy, let alone to explain it. Neither 
do these traditional approaches take into account the various institutional inventions that have 
been put into place in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. 
                                                
45"The"Permanent"Council"(OSCE)"can"only"take"decisions"by"consensus,"leaving"in"reality"a"veto"
power"to"the"member"States."The"Committee"of"Ministers"(CoE)"can"take"decision"by"majority"voting,"
however,"it"has"a"strong"tradition"of"seeking"consensus"and"voting"is"unusual."See"OSCE"3/4;"and"Coe"
5."
46"Strömvik"(2005),"p."40;"Krause"in"Krause"&"Ronzitti"(2012)"pp."20/22."
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2.3!Role!theory!and!sociological!explanations!to!the!EU!external!action!
There is however more recent, innovative research on the EU as a foreign policy actor, 
looking more specifically at these inventions and using other tools to assess the EU actorness.  
One consequence of the Lisbon Treaty is the installation of EU delegations (EEAS), instead 
of the previous external representation that was carried out by the Commission and the 
member state presidency. Hayes (2013) argues that the invention of EU delegations has both 
advantages and less beneficial consequences. On the positive side, it has reduced the number 
of actors and should therefore increase the consistency of EU policy over time. Additionally, 
it has eliminated the bureaucratic rivalry between the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat. On the other hand, Hayes identifies two potential conflicts concerning the EU in 
international organisations. Firstly, a conflict between the EU delegation and the member 
state delegations that will continue to have a strong role in these organisations. Secondly, 
there is a potential conflict between the EU and the international organisation itself, resulting 
in formal restraints (limited status of the EU delegation in the international organisation) and 
informal restraints (the attitude from the organisation/non-EU members towards the EU 
delegation).47 The issues raised by Hayes are important aspects of the new EU institutional 
structure and its role in international organisations. 
 
Bengtsson and Elgström’s study from 2012 has employed role theory to analyse the role(s) of 
the EU in global politics. Their study aims to investigate the EU’s perceived role compared to 
the role expectations held by other actors, operationalized in two case studies. The authors 
aim to find the components that construct the EU role identity, possible role competition and 
the degree of coherence between role conceptions and perceived role performance. In 
resemblance with Smith (2011), Bengtsson and Elgström are trying to find out whether the 
EU is a normative power and if this is reflected in an outsider’s perception. Eventual 
incoherence between its own and other’s perceptions is expected to create tensions and 
prevent the EU from spreading values and norms.48 Their study focuses on the perceptions 
held by non-EU actors, but of equal importance are the internal dynamics and perceptions, as 
demonstrated by Helwig (2013). Helwig analyses the development in relation to the Lisbon 
Treaty and the new role of a High Representative in the EU, concluding that there is a 
expectations-capability gap, where the High Representative does not meet the expectations 
                                                
47"Hayes"in"Jorgensen"et(al((2013),"pp"35/37."
48"Bengtsson & Elgström 2012, pp. 93-94."
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due to lack of institutional pre-conditions.49 These studies are relevant to this study because 
they links perception of roles and perception of performance to actual effectiveness, by 
discussing the discrepancy gap between expectations and (perceived) performance. By 
mapping the interaction between institutional pre-conditions, expectations and perceived 
performance assuming that it is linked to actual performance, we could develop the concepts 
of effectiveness in EU external action. 
 
One researcher who has employed this concept in the internal realms of the EU is Adler-
Nissen (2013). She adopts a Bourdieu-inspired approach when analysing the European 
External Action Service and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, arguing 
that the clash between national foreign services and the EEAS is due to mainly a symbolic 
power struggle, where the EEAS is challenging the state-centred tradition of diplomacy as an 
established social practice and order. This opens the way for another institutional approach 
that focuses less on institutional capacity and traditional, state-associated assets. The hybrid 
actor EEAS could instead be understood as a new actor in a field where “incumbents” (i.e. the 
national foreign services) are much more acquainted with the rules. The success of the EEAS 
is then due to its capability to adapt to the rules of the game. There is of course certain leeway 
to change the rules of the game, but diplomacy is first and foremost attributed to national 
services and the EEAS could only be seen as a legitimate representative if the member States 
recognize it.50 
 
Just as Adler-Nissen, Aggestam (2014) tries to make up with the “deterministic” 
institutionalist approach when discussing leadership in the EU foreign policy. She argues that 
leadership should be seen as an interaction between institutions and the leader, where the 
institutions constitute the frame in which the leader has a possibility to affect the form and 
content of leadership. This interactional approach to leadership considers the leadership 
position not fixed, but as a circular process, where the limits of leadership are constantly 
negotiated by leaders and followers. Leadership is rather understood as a common practice 
than a single leader or function, closely related to the role prescriptions by the member States. 
According to this concept it is also possible to have a common leadership practice where the 
EEAS is allowed to exercise leadership, but does not do it effectively.51 In this way, we have 
                                                
49"Helwig"2013,"p."252"
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managed to completely disconnect the issues of internal and external effectiveness. It is not 
saying that they have nothing to do with each other, but that we have to answer to them one at 
a time. 
 
The approaches taken on by Adler-Nissen (2013) and Aggestam (2014) are helpful in several 
ways to this study. It provides an eclectic theoretical framework drawing from interactional 
role theory as well as sociological institutionalism, aiming to analyse the dynamic processes 
that constitute the new EU representation, where the EEAS has emerged as an actor in the 
diplomatic field and possibly as a leader amongst the national delegations. It moves away 
firstly from the presumption that the EU delegation has a fixed role and acts accordingly 
(position role), secondly from the empiric studies measuring pure performance (often 
referring to a vaguely defined efficiency concept). Instead, it focuses on the perceptions of 
roles, and its constant renegotiation between incumbents (the member states national 
diplomatic services) and the newcomers (the EEAS diplomatic services), which in itself 
arguably is a factor for efficiency. Here we have a whole new framework of analysis of the 
capacity of the EU to act jointly within the Council of Europe and the OSCE, where 
traditionally the member States are represented by their national delegations. This approach is 
particularly helpful in exploring a realm where voting is not the main activity (as in UNGA), 
instead we aim to capture the qualitative discussions and interactions of the diplomatic 
services in Vienna and Strasbourg. 
 
Despite this upsurge of research on EU roles and leadership, there is still little work done on 
what roles that the EU delegations can take. Verlin Laatikainen (2010) has used Oran 
Young’s leadership terminology in order to map out the possible development of the role that 
the EU can take at the United Nations. She argues convincingly that Young’s terminology is 
relevant in the multilateral context, asserting that also non-state actors can provide 
multilateral leadership. 52  The possible leadership roles lined out include the structural 
leadership, where the EU delegation enjoys full membership at the UN and the coordination 
of position is tightly integrated between EU institutions in Brussels and New York; 
entrepreneurial leadership, where the EU delegation coordinates and the member states 
represent; intellectual leadership, where there is a substantive division of labour and the EU 
delegation both coordinates and represents the EU on defined normative agenda items, and 
                                                
52"Verlin"Laatikainen"(2010)"p."483."
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member states can pursue national diplomacy on other issues.53 This is an interesting 
approach, but here again we come to the issue of normative versus material roles, which as 
has been concluded above, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This essay will not 
investigate the normative/material roles, since it does not agree that they are mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, the typology developed by Verlin Laatikainen only addresses formal 
institutional factors. The whole idea by employing role theory is to be able to also address 
informal institutional factors affecting the role of the EU delegation. Therefore, this typology 
is not optimal for this study, although it remains an important contribution. 
2.3.1!Role!theory!as!method!
Role theory is arguably a misleading designation since there is no such thing as a general role 
theory aiming to explain why a phenomenon occurs, but rather a framework of ”topics, 
concepts, and assumptions.”54 It is thereby not a theory to be tested, but it entails assumptions 
that behaviour is predictable depending on social identities and situations. It assumes a link 
between roles and behaviour, and by depicturing roles it should in a future step be possible to 
predict behaviour. Thereby, role theory provides a link between individuals and social 
structures.55 
 
Within political science, role theory has typically been used by new institutionalists to study 
politicians’ behaviour, based on the argument that ”institutional structures greatly constrain(s) 
the conduct of politics by shaping the motives and conduct of politicians”.56 Although 
different approaches emphasize different aspects, it has been recognized within role theory 
that both formal and informal rules and institutions shape behaviour. Searing (1991) argues 
that the best way to explore the roles of politicians is to ask them about their goals and 
ambitions – the motivational approach. He admits however that each approach has its benefits 
and its faults, and that the middle way would be to draw a little on all approaches.  
2.4!Towards!a!theoretical!framework!
I have argued that it is relevant to frame the issue of EU actorness in multilateral fora as a part 
of the EU’s common foreign policy. Traditionally, scholars have tried to evaluate EU 
efficiency by studying voting behaviour. This makes little sense in consensus-based 
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organisations. Furthermore, efficiency should not be reduced to pure performance, since it is 
hardly a satisfactory definition of efficiency and more importantly, it does not explain the 
phenomenon at hand. Neither would it be satisfactory to look only on the institutional settings 
and potential hindrance towards an common EU foreign policy, since the treaties are quite 
clear in this aspect: the member states shall coordinate their actions within other multilateral 
fora, and the EEAS has been designated the role of coordinator. To assume that there is a 
widespread consensus about how a positional role should be played is, however, a simplistic 
view, as argued by Searing (1991). Although there are formal institutional constraints on how 
the EU can act, it also leaves certain leeway for interpretation and negotiation. It is in this 
context that role theory can become relevant to the issue at hand, developing the 
understanding of the role of the EU, in this way exploring both formal and informal 
institutional restraints. 
 
This thesis will draw on an interactional approach to roles, assuming that “symbols, or 
meanings, emerge from processes of social interaction and serve as powerful forces in 
shaping behaviour. Thus, roles are seen as sets of formal and informal rules created and 
recreated through interactions”.57 Instead of assuming that the mere existence of cooperation 
equals an efficient common foreign policy, the execution of a common foreign policy should 
be seen as a complex process with several actors involved. Institutions, understood as both 
official institutions and social and cultural practices, set the frame of action but the frame is 
also in constant negotiation between actors. 
 
Although it should not be excluded that individual officers could have preferences and 
ambitions, as argued by Searing,58 it is reasonable to take an interactional approach given the 
aim of this thesis. It is justified to assume that there are both formal and informal rules or 
institutions that could affect the role, and in the long run the efficiency, of the EEAS. It is 
reasonable to believe that the EEAS and the member States are in a process of role learning 
and role negotiation. Therefore it is relevant to look at the interaction between these 
“newcomers” and “incumbents”, to see how they perceive the role of the EEAS and possible 
institutional hindrance towards EU common action, formal or informal. Institutional 
development and role conceptions could also be linked to levels of Europeanization. High 
level of Europeanization is defined as acceptance by the member states of a leadership role 
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for the EU delegation (top-down coherent action), together with a high level of 
institutionalization of the role. We can also picture a scenario where there is a high level of 
common action for the EU group, but where the position carried out is rather an aggregated 
member state position, coordinated and mediated by the EU delegation (bottom-up coherent 
action). Europeanization is not a linear convergence development but a bi-directional 
negotiated process. Furthermore, it reconciles the dichotomy of seeing the member states or 
the supranational institutions as principal actors.59  
 
Analysis scheme: role conceptions of the EU delegation /level of Europeanization of EU foreign 
policy. 
Roles 
And levels of 
Europeanization 
Role conceptions 
Self-perception 
What expectations does the EU 
delegation have on its own role at 
the OSCE/Council of Europe? 
 
Role prescriptions 
What do Member States expect from the 
EU delegation? 
The EU as the 
newcomer 
 
- Absence of 
coherency 
- Low level of 
Europeanization 
 
The EU delegation is trying to 
establish its role at the organisation 
and/or adapting to the rules of the 
organisation. 
 
 
Member states feel that they can pursue 
another position than the EU and take 
unilateral action, even if the EU issues 
statements. 
The EU as the 
coordinator 
 
- Bottom-up 
- Coherency 
 
The EU takes an active role in 
arranging coordination meetings. The 
EU finds it important for the member 
states to act jointly but it does not push 
strongly for its own agenda. The EU 
therefore takes a mediating role and 
negotiates between the member States 
in order to find a common position. 
 
 
Member states enthusiastically engage in 
EU coordination. 
Member states think it is important to act 
jointly at the OSCE/Council of Europe. The 
joint position is negotiated between the 
member states for each issue, with the EU 
as the mediator. 
 
The EU as a 
leader 
 
- Top-down 
- High level of 
Europeanization 
 
The EU views itself as the agenda-
setter and pushes strongly to carry out 
the Brussels conclusions, even against 
the member states’ will. 
 
 
The member states consider it important to 
carry out the Brussels conclusions and the 
EU politics at the OSCE/Council of Europe. 
The member states prefer to act through the 
EU and consider the EU delegation as the 
leader of the EU group. 
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I have chosen not to employ the terminology invented by Young, employed on multilateral 
organisations by Verlin Laatikainen (2010). This is since 1) I do not find the 
normative/material dichotomy reflected in this terminology relevant to the study and 2) the 
role terminology as operationalized by Verlin Laatikainen focuses on formal institutional 
restraints, whereas I want to research both the formal and informal restraints. Therefore I 
leave the theoretical concept open in this aspect, although some categories have resemblance 
to the categories as employed by Verlin Laatikainen.60 Instead I have included notions from 
Wong (2005) about top-down and bottom-up Europeanization effects. 
 
It should be underlined that the study does not aim to measure actual performance. However, 
it assumes a link between role conceptions (the perceived role performance of the EU 
delegation as compared to the role prescriptions) and an effective EU common foreign policy. 
2.4.1!Research!questions!
The Lisbon Treaty aimed at resolving the issue of common EU representation. However, it 
has raised issues of how it is carried out in multilateral organisations. This essay aims to 
explore whether we can detect a Europeanization effect on EU foreign policy in the context of 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
 
This entails several sub questions: 
- What role has the EU delegation (EEAS) taken in coordinating the EU member states during 
the Ukraine crisis? 
- Are there conflicting role prescriptions among the member states or the EU delegation itself 
regarding which role the EU delegation should take? 
- What role do the member states take in this process? 
 
The study aims to look at the internal role conceptions of the EU delegation assuming that 
this has an impact on the actual outcome. Without claiming to measure actual performance, I 
would like to underline this assumption, and argue that the study of roles serves as a first step 
in a previously under-researched area. There is little or no research on how the EU 
delegations act in these fora, particularly since the installation of EEAS delegations, which is 
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 22 
a very recent invention.61 I argue that this integrated approach to the concept of efficiency 
allows for a more qualitative understanding of the EU common foreign policy. 
 
The issue of the Ukraine crisis is a part of the EU foreign policy, which according to previous 
research is an area where the member states have the most difficulty to cooperate and where 
the EU is the least cohesive, since cooperation is still based on consensus.62 Through the 
Lisbon Treaty, there is a formulated goal to create a common European foreign policy, which 
is why we could expect enhanced coherence and cooperation also in this policy area. 
2.4.2!Contribution!
This essay strives to contribute to the fields of European studies, international relations theory 
on diplomacy and EU foreign policy analysis. Firstly, by exploring the EU’s relations with 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe, relations that have been previously under-researched. 
Secondly, it will integrate the study into the more general studies of the EU common foreign 
policy, and thus be able to draw on theoretical approaches in this tradition. A thorough 
theoretical approach has been surprisingly absent in inter-organisational studies. Thus, this 
study could contribute in both an empiric and a theoretical way to the understanding of the 
development of a common EU foreign policy, diplomacy and engagement in other 
multilateral organisations. The phenomenon of EEAS delegations is relatively new and there 
is little research on its role in multilateral organisations. 
 
3."Research(design(and(methods!
3.1!Design!of!the!study!
This Master thesis is an explorative, comparative case study of the EEAS delegation’s role in 
EU common foreign politics in multilateral organisations. It will study the EU group 
dynamics and the role of the EU delegation during the Ukraine crisis at the multilateral 
organisations Council of Europe and the OSCE, both relevant actors during the Ukraine crisis. 
Furthermore, they are relevant in terms of EU coordination, since all EU member States are 
also members of both organisations.  
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The cases of the EU at the Council of Europe and the OSCE could be categorized as an 
exemplifying case, since it is a part of a broader category (the EEAS representation in 
Strasbourg and Vienna as examples of the EEAS representations all over the world).63 The 
case in the case, however, the Ukrainian crisis, could be argued to be an extreme case and 
therefore not representative64 – crisis management has been argued to be where the EU have 
most difficulties to cooperate. But that is also the most interesting case – when decisions must 
be taken quickly, will the EU step up and lead the member states or will member states step 
up? Will the member states follow the EU position? Furthermore it must be underlined that it 
is not necessarily an extreme case, but maybe just a “hard case”. This does not exclude the 
prospects of comparison to other cases (in the same category), but the type of case should be 
kept in mind when analysing the results. 
 
There is also a comparative element of course since two organisations are included. Most 
interesting would be if these two cases would turn out differently, or if the EU has taken on 
different roles in the OSCE and at the Council of Europe, or if the member states interact 
differently with the EU delegation. Instead of just looking at whether the EU has managed to 
speak with one voice or not, this design of study will help to explore the EU group dynamics 
and the delegation’s role as a constantly re-negotiated process through a snap shot. These 
tools could then help to understand why the EU did or didn’t succeed to act jointly, in a more 
inventive way than “the member States did not want to”. 
3.2!Analytical!approach!
This explorative and interpretive study has taken an abductive approach since it aims to 
explore the perceptions of the interviewees themselves of the role(s) taken by the EU 
delegation and the interaction with the member states. The typology of the different roles 
taken by the EU delegation has not been thoroughly established in previous literature, despite 
occasional attempts.65 Therefore, it cannot be said to be theory testing, but rather exploring 
how the interviewees themselves describe the roles taken by the EU delegation and the role 
prescriptions by the member states, by studying language, the meanings and perspectives in 
their worldview. 66 The EEAS is a relatively new institution and it is reasonable to believe that 
the roles of the delegations are not yet fully established, especially with the perspective of a 
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leadership as a constant process of negotiation.67 Furthermore, theory testing is difficult with 
such a small sample. 
 
The study will be a qualitative thematic analysis, using interviews as material. Interviews 
allow for exploring a phenomenon more in-depth and at the same time distinguish themes and 
categories. It allows for being “systematic and analytic but not rigid”, and the approach to the 
themes and categories is reflexive, with a possibility to revise the categories based on the 
interviews.68 There is no agreed definition of thematic analysis, but it has been used in 
various ways. Prainsack and Kitzberger (2009) claimed to use a thematic analysis, since they 
wrote about “themes that emerged from our interviews”.69 This approach will be used in this 
study as well, by looking for repetition of topics. Repetition is said to be the most common 
criteria for establishing when a pattern in the data constitutes a theme. Other ways of 
identifying themes are to look for indigenous typologies or categories, and similarities.70 
 
The analysis scheme developed above (page 20) will serve as a basis for analysis. The 
interview guide (see appendix) has been developed accordingly, relating to the themes and 
expectations outlined in the analysis scheme, deduced from previous research. 
3.3!Interviews!as!a!methodology!
The semi-structured interview technique allows us to lead the interview through important 
themes and still leave room for the interviewee to elaborate on a subject. Qualitative 
interviews are valuable when the focus of the study is the interviewee’s point of view. A 
semi-structured interview normally has a set of questions or subjects that the interviewer uses, 
and preferably the questions should be posed in the same way each time. It is however more 
flexible than structured interviews, since it also allows for follow-up questions without 
putting reliability and validity of measurement at stake, in difference to quantitative and 
structured interviews.71  
 
The method of interviews is relevant due to the nature of the research aim and questions. 
Interviews are useful when you want to study perceptions and go in-depth. Theoretically, it 
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might have been possible to do a qualitative text analysis on the same subject, and then try to 
detect perceptions of the delegations through written statements. But apart from that it would 
limit the in-depth exploration, another restraint would be the scarce access to documentation. 
Although all EU statements are public, it is difficult to draw any conclusion as to how the 
member states perceive the EU delegation and who is dominating the discussion and agenda 
setting. After a quick check, one finds that there are very few official national declarations 
made by member states. This could of course be interpreted as if the member states prefer 
acting through the EU and find the EU delegation a legitimate leader. This would however be 
a simplistic explanation.  
 
In order to understand this, we must understand the environment in which they act; the 
difference at the Committee of ministers (CoE) and the Permanent Council (OSCE), 
compared to UNGA, is that there is a tradition of consensus; in the Permanent Council all 
decisions are taken by consensus. In the Committee of ministers there is a possibility to vote 
on a decision if consensus is not reached; however, the emphasis is on consensus. Therefore, 
disagreement within the group might not be reflected in the final result. Furthermore, there are 
no public records of minutes, so only the statements that the delegations wish to publish will 
be accessible. Additionally, since this study will look at the EU coordination process, which is 
conducted even more in the outskirts of public documentation, it is hardly likely that we will 
find relevant documents that will help us answer our questions. Furthermore, as underlined by 
several interviewees, the EU statements in Brussels are often broad72 and therefore it would 
be difficult to estimate if the EU member states in Strasbourg and Vienna have been acting 
accordingly. 
 
Most interviews were conducted by phone. One interview was conducted face-to-face, and 
one by Skype. To hold interviews by phone is not necessarily a disadvantage, as argued by 
Alan Bryman (2012). In fact, it could even be an advantage, since it prevents respondents to 
be affected by characteristics or the presence of the interviewer, reducing this bias. Although 
some researchers claim that material retrieved by phone interviews is inferior to face-to-face 
interviews (respondent less engaged in the interview process, more likely to respond “don’t 
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know” to a question),73 other studies have showed that it does not affect the kinds of 
responses you get.74 I did not notice any difference in the engagement in the interview, length 
of the replies et cetera between the phone interviews and the interviews held in person. 
Neither did I encounter any problems language-wise, even though the interviews were held in 
two different languages. Possibly, it might be that I had to repeat the questions more 
frequently in the interviews held in English with persons who did not have English as their 
first language. This, of course, could cause some frustration during the interview process, but 
should not affect the over-all result.  
 
All the interviews were recorded except for n° 3, due to technical problems. All the 
interviewees gave their consent the interviews being recorded. By recording the interviews, 
the process was considerably enhanced. Firstly, it helped creating a smooth conversation 
during the interview. Taking notes during the interview would have disrupted the process, 
which was demonstrated during interview n° 3. Secondly, a recorded interview is of course 
much better in terms of reliability of material. Furthermore, it forces you to reflect over the 
material and re-evaluate. Maybe you will understand something differently when listening to 
the interview afterwards. It also helps you in being critical towards your own interview 
technique, in order to see if you are varying the phrasing of the questions, which could create 
bias in some cases. Additionally, by transcribing the interviews, you get to know your 
material thoroughly, which helps for an efficient and qualitative analysis process.75 
3.4!Sampling!
The sampling of the material is purposive, deduced from the research questions that are aimed 
at exploring a certain phenomenon (role conceptions of the EEAS delegation) on a certain 
issue (Ukraine) within certain organisations (OSCE and the Council of Europe). The 
individuals sampled have been selected in order to differ from each other in terms of key 
characteristics that have been identified as important in previous theory.76 
 
A recurrent problem in qualitative research sampling is to know how many people to 
interview before theoretical saturation has been achieved, and there are no formal criteria as 
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to when this would occur.77 In the final result, I managed to conduct a total of nine interviews. 
The individuals have been chosen in order to represent both big, small and middle power 
states and the EEAS. There are two imbalances in the selection. Firstly, it is slightly 
unbalanced between representatives at the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The aim was to 
gather four or five interviews for each organisation, but this was not possible due to practical 
reasons. This is probably the biggest restraint on the study, since it will limit the ability to 
draw conclusions regarding the OSCE, which is under-represented in the sample. The 
difficulties to find interviewees connected to the OSCE were much due to my limited network 
in this organisation. However, it should be underlined that it is a first attempt to explore a 
phenomenon that has previously been under-researched, through an interpretative qualitative 
analysis. Therefore, the aim was not to find a sample big enough to enable generalization, 
which in general is very difficult in qualitative research, 78 but rather to explore and to find 
factors that are relevant to the research problem. 
 
Secondly, it was generally more difficult to speak to the so-called “big” member state 
delegations. My purpose was to cover both big, small (eastern) and middle (Nordic et c) 
member states, since previous literature has indicated that this might be a key factor.79 In 
Vienna, I did not manage to speak to any big member state which is regrettable, especially 
since my results as well indicate a difference between small/middle and big member state 
behaviour/role perceptions. Otherwise I managed to collect a sample that corresponded to my 
initial requirements. I managed to collect interviewees representing national delegations and 
the EEAS, connected to both organisations. I did however discover another group that should 
have been represented in the sample. Several respondents claimed that there was a general 
scepticism among southern member states towards an EU common foreign policy.80 This had 
not been accounted for when sampling the interviews. In future studies, this group should be 
represented as well within the sample. 
 
In the table below I have summarized some information about the interviewees, all while 
trying not to compromise their anonymity.  
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Table over interviews 
Interview n° Date Delegation Organisation Interview held in 
1 2015-04-27  
(30 min) 
Sweden OSCE Swedish/Phone 
2 2015-05-05 
(50 min) 
Ireland Council of Europe English/Skype 
3 2015-05-08 
(25 min) 
EEAS Council of Europe Swedish/In person 
4 2015-05-29 
(30 min) 
Sweden Council of Europe Swedish/Phone 
5 2015-06-01 
(25 min) 
Estonia Council of Europe English/Phone 
6 2015-06-04 
(30 min) 
EEAS OSCE English/Phone 
7 2015-06-09 
(20 min) 
United Kingdom Council of Europe English/Phone 
8 2015-06-19 
(25 min) 
EEAS Council of Europe English/Phone 
9 2015-07-03 
(30 min) 
Estonia OSCE English/Phone 
 
Well aware of the fact that my choice to let the interviewees stay anonymous could limit the 
credibility of the study, I chose to give them the opportunity since the majority of 
interviewees set this as a condition for participating in the study. Several delegations that 
were asked to participate refused with reference to the sensitivity of the subject, even with the 
prospect of being anonymous. 
 
The interviewees were approached as respondents whose perspectives could help us to 
recreate the institutional context and depict role conceptions. But they were also approached 
as expert informants whose particular experiences could help understand specific aspects of 
the organisations they were acting within.81 This study relies on both types on information. 
On the one hand, their perceptions of roles are at the centre of attention, but on the other hand, 
their expertise and familiarity with the organisation(s) and the questions at hand should not be 
overlooked. Their knowledge of the institutional environment should not be diminished to 
mere perceptions, but taken into account as information provided by an informant, of course 
critically scrutinized as all information. 
 
Conducting interviews is always a risky method, and furthermore, it is a time consuming 
method. Although it would have been preferable to have a larger sample of interviews, the 
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number of conducted interviews is reasonable within such a limited study. Since the big 
versus small/middle member state (and possibly a southern aspect) showed to be an important 
factor, more cases should be added before reaching complete theoretical saturation. The big 
versus small member state factor was not my main hypothesis, however. The aim of the study 
was to see a) whether there is a difference in member state versus EEAS delegations’ 
perceptions and b) whether there is a difference between in the role conceptions of the EU 
delegation between the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In relation to these research 
questions, the study is still of relevance as an initial explorative study of a phenomenon that 
has been under-researched in the past. The findings have pointed to interesting factors that 
could be explored in a future step. Furthermore, the study indicates a difference in how the 
EEAS delegation acts at the OSCE and the Council of Europe, making the comparative study 
approach relevant. 
3.5!Reliability!and!validity!of!the!research!
Reliability and validity in qualitative research is not as clearly defined as in quantitative 
research. However, “validity” has in qualitative contexts been interpreted as whether “you are 
observing, identifying, or ‘measuring’ what you say you are”.82 In this respect, there are many 
ways to explore the EU as a foreign policy actor. I will not argue that exploring role 
conceptions is the best way, but I will argue that it contributes to the over-all understanding of 
the EU as a foreign policy actor. Furthermore, as argued above, in the context of the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE, you cannot study for example voting behaviour as it is done in the 
UN context. The limited access to documents is also a contributing factor to the choices of 
design of study. It should be noted that the study is not aiming at measuring actual behaviour 
of the EU delegation or the member states, but it illustrates perceptions of the interviewees, 
which is assumed to be linked to actual behaviour. If you see research on a phenomenon as a 
process over time, this would be the first step at exploring and interpreting roles and possible 
factors to the role conceptions of the EU delegation. This is a way to lay ground for future 
research, where actual performance might be relevant. 
 
As for external validity, or the degree to which the findings can be generalized, the study 
remains humble. Generalization is usually a problem in qualitative research, where the aim is 
to gain in-depth knowledge and the samples are often quite small.83 It is also quite obvious 
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that just because the EU acts in one way in Strasbourg, it does not mean that it acts in the 
same way in New York or Paris. Due to the small sample, it is difficult to say if we can 
establish with certainty the roles of the EU delegation even at the OSCE or the Council of 
Europe. If we would ask another set of member state delegations in these organisations, 
would they say the same thing? This is a crucial question especially in respect of the so-called 
“big” member states, since we could expect differences between the EU sceptic United 
Kingdom and the EU-friendly Germany, for example. Therefore we cannot with certainty say 
that this is the role that the EU delegation has taken. But we can say something about how the 
roles are perceived, contributing factors, repetitions between different kinds of delegations in 
the role conceptions, and establish themes that should be further explored in future studies.  
 
As for reliability, this is also a recurring problem in qualitative studies, since it is impossible 
to “freeze” a social setting and the circumstances of an initial study.84 The best strategy would 
probably be to make the process as transparent and open as possible, so that the reader can 
follow the argumentation of the study and see for themselves the key quotes that are used for 
drawing conclusions. 
 
4."Background!
Before starting the analysis, it is necessary to make some definitions: explain some 
institutional settings within the multilateral organisations, the mapping of the EU’s 
relationship with each of them, and define the Ukraine crisis. 
4.1!The!Ukraine!crisis!
Firstly, the Ukraine crisis has only been shortly introduced and not yet defined. The events 
erupted when the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych on November 21 2013 suspended 
the preparing of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The agreement was 
part of the EU’s attempts to deepen its relations with its Eastern partners beyond the Eastern 
Partnership, and the Vilnius meeting of November 2013 was supposed to be the delivery 
summit. The discontinuation of the agreement was badly looked upon within the EU as well 
as by parts of the Ukrainian population, resulting in mass demonstrations (so-called 
“Euromaidan”) in Kiev and other parts of the country. On 22 February, president Yanukovych 
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was ousted after having fled Kiev. The agreement was finally concluded in two parts, on 21 
March and on 27 June under the post-revolutionary government.85 
 
Ukraine itself was internally divided on the issue. Roughly the dividing lines were between 
the EU-friendly West and the Eastern parts of Ukraine, which hosts a large Russian 
population. In the autonomous region of Crimea, the citizens demanded a referendum on its 
status, leading eventually to the annexation86 of the autonomous region of Crimea by the 
Russian Federation on 18 March. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, violence escalated 
into a long-during conflict between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-
Russian groups.87 The Geneva accord of April 2014 was intended to de-escalate the situation, 
but the uneasy situation still persists in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Arguably, Russia 
has violated the Geneva accord several times, the situation in the regions is still instable and a 
blame game between the EU and Russia is still on going. Nevertheless, the post-revolution 
Ukrainian regime signed the Association Agreement with the EU and is working with several 
international organisations, amongst them the OSCE and the Council of Europe, in order to 
build up a stable regime.88 
 
As always it is difficult to research a still on-going phenomenon. We cannot fully evaluate the 
EU’s performance during the Ukraine crisis, but since this study does not aim to map actual 
performance but role perceptions, this poses less of a problem. If we were to do a document 
study for example, then it would be more sensible to the time limitations. Now we do not 
need a more precise time definition of the crisis. The only reference to time will be the 
question of whether the respondents think that the EU performance has developed over time 
during the crisis. 
4.2!The!EU!and!the!OSCE!
History  
The EU and the OSCE have a long tradition of cooperation, which has been intensified in the 
new century. The development can be seen in the light of the end of the Cold war, after which 
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the grounds for cooperation within the OSCE and the EU respectively changed profoundly. 
The OSCE focused increasingly on intra-state conflict rather than inter-state conflict, and 
introduced a “common and comprehensive” and later on a “human” security agenda, 
distinguishing it from the “limited collective defence of NATO”. This comprehensive security 
cooperation was increasingly paying attention to democratic transitions and prevention of 
intra-state conflicts in the Eastern Europe, at the same time as the EU started looking east. 
The EU equally took an interest in the democratic transitions of their eastern neighbours, both 
with a view to enlargement and to a stable eastern neighbourhood. While this functional 
overlap could have created tensions between the organisations, it has instead been considered 
to create synergies. Apart from increased common missions, the EU sees engagement in the 
OSCE as an important accession criterion to the EU.89  
 
Galbreath and Brosig (2012) further argue that the OSCE’s main asset traditionally has been 
to provide for a dialogue on European security in a neutral way that neither the EU, nor 
NATO could provide, especially since both the US and the Russian Federation are 
members.90 The same could be said during the current Ukraine crisis, since not only all the 
EU members but also Russia and Ukraine are members.  
 
Form of participation 
The role of the European Union in the OSCE has never been formally defined in a 
comprehensive manner, although the established practice of the EU presence dates back to the 
preparatory negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, in which the European 
Commission was involved. EU participation was formalized in November 2006. The EU 
participation is justified by the fact that the legal competence concerning some issues treated 
in the OSCE has been transferred from the EU member states to the European Union. Hence, 
already the Helsinki Final Act was signed by Prime Minister Aldo Moro “as Prime Minister 
of Italy and in his capacity as President of the Council of the European Communities”. The 
other key OSCE documents were signed directly by the then Presidents of the European 
Commission. Hence, even if the EEAS delegation is a new invention, in Vienna there is a 
long practice of EU participation in the main bodies of the OSCE.91 
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The EU engages primarily in coordinating member States at the Permanent Council. The 
Permanent Council takes decisions on activities and mechanisms, and issue statements and 
declarations. The EU has a seat at the Council and the delegation can intervene in the same 
way as the participating States of the OSCE and speak on behalf of the EU member states, 
making it “in principle, treated as an individual OSCE participating State”.92 
The!Ukrainian!crisis!in!the!OSCE!
The OSCE’s response to the crisis has ranged from high-level diplomacy and multilateral 
dialogue to monitoring, fact-finding and military visits. It has assisted in monitoring elections, 
monitoring and reporting on the situation for minorities and much more. The importance of 
the OSCE involvement on the ground and as a forum for dialogue has been emphasized by 
the Geneva Joint Statement on Ukraine, agreed upon by the foreign ministers of Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation, the United States and the EU on April 17 2014. The agreement was 
aiming at disarmament, restraint from violence, national dialogue and support to the 
Ukrainian government in holding free and fair polls and elections in May 2014. The OSCE 
became at the centre of events again when forces in Eastern Ukraine captivated OSCE 
military observers between April 25 and May 3 2014.93 
 
The Permanent Council take decisions only by consensus, in difference to the Committee of 
Ministers (CoE). Between November 2013 and July 2014, the EU delegation issued 35 
statements related to the Ukraine-Russian conflict at the Permanent Council meetings.94 
4.3!The!EU!and!the!Council!of!Europe!
The notion of ‘natural partners’ that has been used to describe the EU-UN relationship could 
also apply to the EU’s relation with the Council of Europe. The EU and the CoE base their 
relations on the principles set out in the ECHR convention.95 Just as for the OSCE, a 
membership at the Council of Europe is often viewed as a first step to approach the EU, and 
although there is a notion of conflict there are also considerable coordination efforts between 
the organisations. The efforts to address possible overlaps have resulted in statements, 
recommendations and resolutions under the headline of “European Union and Council Of 
Europe human rights agendas: synergies not duplication”. The Parliamentary Assembly 
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(PACE) recommendation 2027 from 2013 states that “the Council of Europe’s binding legal 
instruments (…) constitute an effective system of human rights protection and promotion of 
the rule of law in all its member States, including those which are also members of the 
European Union. (…) The Europe-wide common standards and the level of protection set by 
the Council of Europe’s legal instruments must not be undercut or undermined by member 
States of the Council of Europe or by the European Union. (…) The Assembly reiterates its 
view that reinventing existing norms and setting up parallel structures creates double 
standards and opportunities for ‘forum shopping’”. 96  The formulation denote a certain 
frustration from the part of the Council of Europe over the EU’s increasing involvement in 
“soft” areas such as human rights, democracy and standard-setting. Especially the EU Court 
of Justice has increasingly set up its own human rights jurisdiction.97  
 
Another demonstration of the tensions but also of the efforts to resolve the inter-
organisational relations is the on-going negotiations on the EU accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Lisbon Treaty entails the EU’s accession to the European 
Convention, but the accession has shown to be more complicated than expected and it has 
been contested both internally and externally. The last development in the accession process 
is that the EU Court of Justice ruled in their opinion of December 18 2014 that the draft 
agreement was incompatible with EU law, yet again stalling an enhanced cooperation 
between the two organisations.98 
 
The EU’s legal personality and a future accession to the Convention has provoked discussions 
on as to how the EU should be represented within the Committee of Ministers, the decisive 
body of the Council of Europe. Today, the EU is an observer to the Committee of Ministers 
represented by the EEAS. As observers they cannot vote, but they participate regularly at the 
meetings of the Committee of Ministers and in the working groups, and they can issue 
declarations. Their most important role at the CoE is to coordinate the member States’ 
positions through EU coordination meetings.99 
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The Ukrainian crisis at the Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe is supporting Ukraine through many mechanisms and institutions. In 
January 2015 a new action plan was launched in order to address the quickly changing events 
in Ukraine. The action plan aims at supporting Ukraine’s democratic consolidation, giving 
expert advice on constitutional and justice reforms, democratic governance, combatting 
economic crime and protection of human rights. The Council of Europe has initiated a range 
of mechanisms to respond to the crisis: an International Advisory Panel to promote 
confidence through an independent investigation of acts of violence; assistance by the Venice 
Commission regarding Constitution reform; assistance to the preparations of Presidential 
elections in May 2014, and much more.100 The CoE has been recognized by both Ukraine and 
Russia as a valuable forum for dialogue and cooperation during the crisis, although the 
Russian Federation has become slightly more averse towards the CoE since the Parliamentary 
Assembly decided to suspend the Russian delegation’s voting rights.101 
 
The Committee of Ministers (CM) is the decision-making body of the Council of Europe, 
which has followed the Ukraine events closely at their weekly meetings. Between November 
2013 and July 2014, the Committee of Ministers held 30 such meetings, including a 
Ministerial meeting in Vienna on 5-6 May and 3 extraordinary meetings with view to the 
events in Ukraine. During this period, Ukraine appeared officially on the agenda 12 times, but 
was in reality discussed at every meeting from January 2014 and onwards.102  
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5."Analysis!
The analysis has been lined out in order to answer to the questions in the analysis scheme. 
However, the sections are divided in order to discuss different themes, rather than one section 
for the EU officials’ perceptions and one for the national delegations. Structuring the analysis 
by themes allows for an integrated discussion. 
5.1!The!role!of!the!EU9delegation!!
When respondents were asked to describe the role of the EU delegation, they tended to touch 
upon both actual performance (as they perceive it) and their idea of the role. The responses on 
a general level are in many aspects strikingly similar between Strasbourg and Vienna.  
5.1.1!Role!prescriptions!9!what!the!EU!delegation!should!do!
The overwhelming majority of the national delegations point to two important tasks for the 
EU delegation: to make the EU heard and to keep the member states unified.103 It is important 
that the EU delegation “make member states heard”104 and that the EU “does not sit there 
quietly”. The role of the EU delegation is to “keep the EU group together as far as 
possible.”105 Because, ”if there is no unity, the EU can’t speak. And if someone speaks and 
the EU remains silent, then that is of course embarrassing”.106 “[A]nd if we cannot agree, 
then we must find a common denominator, which in that case is not very substantial… but we 
should at least say something.”107  
 
One member state representative underlined the importance of sending a common message, 
since “every common statement shows cohesion, agreement, unified position and common 
values. Because one speaks for all. […] This is very natural. I know it is no-one’s interest to 
show divisions or different opinions within the EU, because it definitely doesn’t serve us 
well.”108 So the EU delegation “would be somewhat like the European phone number within 
the OSCE, to make reference to Kissinger’s famous statement.” 109 
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One respondent who differs from the others is the representative from the United Kingdom. 
The interviewee explains that “The UK doesn’t agree with the EU coordination and we don’t 
agree that the EU should speak with one voice at the Council of Europe.” This is since “the 
Council of Europe is a different organisation and we have to speak here as members of the 
Council of Europe, not as members of the EU. [I]n international organisations, we don’t 
speak as a part of the EU, we speak on our own.110 This is a very demonstrative statement 
that will be discussed more later.  
 
When the EEAS officials were asked the same question they took a surprisingly humble 
approach to it: “The EU delegation’s primary function is to coordinate, and this role (…) has 
been re-enforced with the Lisbon Treaty, but it has not replaced the national 
representations.”111 Although if, “from our perspective, the member states should accept that 
we have decided something in Brussels and that they then have less leeway to push for their 
own position [at the Council of Europe]”, it is “a balance in general in our work between 
pushing for our own positions and to mediate. [I]t is something that characterizes our work at 
the EEAS. We have to be pro-active and anticipate the member states with agendas and 
issues, and at the same time have a sensitivity for the member state positions.”112 
 
But the EU delegation has to ensure that the EU position “is represented, is the same. [S]o 
basically its coordination role is a big portion of what we do.” The official describes the role 
of the EU delegation as being “the first persons to flag, if there is something that wouldn’t 
correspond to the EU approach”.113 Another EEAS official admits that “it is not so much 
that [the EU delegation is] trying to impose their policy line but rather to make sure that 
there is a meaningful and substantial common position.”114 
5.1.2!Perceived!role!performance!
The EU delegations in Strasbourg and Vienna are both described as active and visible.115 
When asking follow-up questions on in which way they are being active, the interviewees 
denote different understandings of “being active”. One national respondent in Strasbourg 
describes it in the following way: 
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“I think active in terms of coordinating a view. I wouldn’t say very active though, because I 
mean, obviously, we have our EU head’s mission meeting on Monday, where we can discuss 
issues and agree common view. But then in the actual deputies’ meeting, EU is just one 
voice”. “So yes, […] it’s an active role, but it is more about putting forward a joint 
statement.” 116 
 
This is being re-iterated by another interviewee who claims that “the coordination positions 
tends to be relatively minor”, but rather, “it facilitates exchanges of views between member 
states.“117 Several interviewees have in fact, often with their own words, described the role of 
the EU delegation as a facilitating or mediating one, rather than a leading role.118 “They are 
chairing, they are coordinating, but in essence they are not saying – to be very clear – they 
are not […] putting […] words into the member states’ mouths. […] Up to the very comma, 
the agreement comes from the member states.”119 
 
So despite the fact that all member state officials describe the EU delegation as an active 
participant with an important and central role, the EU delegation is not described as a leader. 
Many member states value the role that the EU delegation has taken. A member state official 
in Vienna says that “not only that the EU delegation has taken an active part, but I would 
also say that it is natural. Because otherwise it wouldn’t make much sense to have the EU 
delegation here […] They are doing what they are supposed to do, actually.”120 
5.1.3!The!Ukraine!crisis!–!a!way!to!institutionalize!the!EU!delegation’s!role?!
Many of the respondents claim that the EU delegation takes different roles depending on the 
issue. Ukraine is a part of the foreign policy portfolio, which makes it a “difficult issue” to 
coordinate. On the other hand, it is a high priority issue in Brussels and there have been many 
Foreign Affairs Council conclusions,121 which is why we could expect that the EU delegation 
pushes strongly for the Brussels position here. 
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In Strasbourg 
At the Council of Europe, the Ukraine issue is described as an atypical example,122 due to its 
high-level political character and the foreign policy nature, which makes it a member state 
competence.123 It is therefore more difficult to coordinate and interviewees give witness of 
difficulties to get through with an EU language initially, even though there were strong 
positions coming out of Brussels. 124  
 
“[The Ukraine crisis] is actually an issue where the member states are mostly the ones 
speaking where they have the real power to influence as opposed to the EU. […] This is an 
excellent example where the EU rely as much on its member states to transpose its 
position.”125 
 
A respondent claims that in regards to“(t)he Ukraine… parts of it has certainly been of lowest 
common denominator. That tends to be on delivering a statement. […] I mean, the EU has 
this relatively strong position on the Ukraine, in terms of Foreign Affairs Council. When it 
comes to Ukraine decisions here, […] it is more of a facilitating role. [M]ore to coordinate 
the positions to make sure that the EU states doesn’t split […] because Ukraine is so 
important on the EU agenda”. And then you cannot have “second-rate ambassadors in 
Strasbourg who are completely at odds with the real policy development in Brussels. And you 
wouldn’t get that in New York, for example.126 
 
Another respondent agrees: “[i]nitially it was very difficult to get through with EU 
language… what has been agreed upon in Brussels is not necessarily what we can present 
when face to face with the Russians. The language was much more lenient, but now it is 
easier. [At the OSCE] they manage to present an EU language and we have not succeeded in 
the same way.”127  
 
The interviewee perceive an enhancement during the crisis in regards to the coherence in the 
EU group, confirmed by yet another interviewee:” I think it has united the EU members even 
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more. They feel like they are a family or so. Different feelings, different opinions, but 
[committed to] come out of the room united!”128 
 
The perceived enhanced performance is accompanied by a perceived enhanced leadership at 
the delegation. The national representatives in Strasbourg underline a change in role 
performance by the EU delegation during the Ukraine crisis, pointing to the shift in leadership 
at the delegation as a factor.129 “The previous head of the EU delegation […] tried to stay 
very much in the role of the moderator of the meeting, and not to lead. But it was before the 
crisis or in the beginning of the crisis. Now […] we have another head [who] is trying to lead 
and negotiate and bring the common position forward and re-word it, and more active.130 
More on the importance of personal leadership later, but it should be noted that respondents 
claim that the EU delegation in Strasbourg has moved from being a mere moderator in a 
meeting to a more active role during the Ukraine crisis.131 One interviewee seems to have the 
answer: “[A]t the same time the situation has changed, it requires more leadership.” 132 
 
The shift in behaviour seems to be limited to the coordination meetings, however. At the 
deputies’ meeting, with non-EU member states present, their role is more limited: “They have 
been much more careful. Naturally, they read the statements we have agreed on, those times 
that we have agreed on something…”133 
 
Whilst the national delegations seem to perceive a shift in the EU delegation’s role during the 
Ukraine crisis, the EEAS official does not consider the Ukraine crisis as a factor. “I wouldn’t 
say that the Ukraine crisis is the sort of factor that influences this more than others. If I have 
to point to things that changed the scope of the relationship much more, then [it is] the EU’s 
increased involvement and increased exclusive competence on many issues that are also 
covered by the Council of Europe. So there the enhanced position of the EU is much more 
visible than in the Ukraine context.”134  
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To reconnect to the issue of activeness and how it can be interpreted, the EEAS official makes 
an interesting reflection in regards to the Ukraine crisis.  
 
“I think the delegation’s role is very active currently. Of course what you call ‘the 
mediating’, I call it the ‘re-active’ portion of our work. Because it takes up a lot of time also. 
But recently […] under the new ambassador this has been very much focus on this 
‘activeness’. On initiative, on being truly a leader on the issues where we can be a leader. 
[…] Yes absolutely […] the role on the Ukraine is very very active.”135 
 
In Vienna 
At the OSCE, the EU delegation had a very different starting point, where it to a much larger 
extent speaks on behalf of the EU group at the deputies’ meetings. An EU official underlines 
that “the EU delegation speaks on behalf of the EU and the member states” and therefore has 
“a relatively strong role in coordinating member states and representing the EU.” However, 
the role that the EU delegation takes depends on the issue. “If they do not have any strong 
feelings in Brussels for the issue, then they take a mediating role. But if Brussels have an 
interest [in the issue], then they say […] that this you should push for.” “[D]uring this crisis 
they have had very clear instructions from Brussels to keep up the position and not 
deteriorate.”136 
 
The EEAS official reflects over the coordination during the Ukraine crisis: “The member 
states are very disciplined in Vienna […] but it gets more and more difficult […] it takes 
sometimes long time to come to an agreement and it is also a bit more tense than it used to 
be.” He concludes that it is “probably thanks to the established kind of practice over years 
[that] we are now able to still function quite effectively even though it is such a difficult 
situation.” 137  
 
The member state representatives in Vienna whom I have talked to confirmed the picture of 
loyal member states. The EU delegation has “fallen into place, they have taken their role 
during this crisis”.138  The EU has “held up the position that has been decided in Brussels, I 
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think, there has been no local diversions.”139 The fact that the EU is speaking on the behalf of 
the member states is underlined, although, technically, “if one member state wants to add 
some specifics because let’s say some bilateral agreement with Kiev, […] then there is no 
problem to have a national statement” as long as it “doesn’t weaken the EU statement”. But 
“it is not that some details are not put in (to the statement) and then they want to make a 
national statement […]. This is not the case. This is not how it works.”140 This might be why 
the respondents in Vienna describe the Ukraine issue as more of a typical issue,141 in 
difference to Strasbourg – the well established practice has facilitated a smooth process even 
when there is a difficult issue where the competence lay with the member states. 
 
Although, as we will see later, one big limitation to the EU delegation’s role is that it cannot 
engage in spontaneous debate at the deputies’ meeting. In these cases, according to another 
national representative, member states sometimes respond to comments related to the EU. “It 
is often the big [member states] that goes into [the discussion] and say something in their 
national capacity, that can be above or below the EU position.” 142 So in this respect, the 
opinions of the national representatives diverge. 
5.2!Explanatory!factors!
During my interviews, the respondents have pointed to different explanatory factors as to why 
the EU delegation’s role is perceived in a certain way, why they act in a certain way, and 
regarding institutional restraints and differences in member state behaviour. Some factors 
have been discussed already in previous literature, whereas some were new to me. 
5.2.1!The!EU!delegation’s!status!at!the!organisation!
 
First of all, there is a distinct difference between the OSCE and the Council of Europe with 
regard to the participation form of the EU delegation: While at the OSCE, the EU delegation 
is “in principle, treated as an individual OSCE participating State”143, in principle speaking on 
behalf of the EU member states when there is EU competence,144 the EU delegation in 
Strasbourg seems to have a more limited role. One interviewee describe the EU role during 
the meetings in Strasbourg as follows:  
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“[Their role] is relatively limited […] and it has to be because of their status. They don’t 
have any voting rights.” “So they tend to act in the way that some more hands-off member 
states do, that they will deliver statements related to themselves, and they will deliver the 
common statements, once agreed upon by the member states. […] but when it comes into 
actual debate […] they don’t tend to get into negotiation, or textual negotiation if it is about a 
decision. And they don’t tend to respond toward a member state. So, if Russia says something 
critical, they will rarely raise voice.”145 
 
According to an EU official, this is because the formal role of the EU at the Council of 
Europe “has not been legally resolved. […] It is less than a member, more than an observer. 
[…] What it means in practice in the Committee of Ministers is that of course it is mostly 
member states who speak and present their position.”146 
!
This strongly contrasts to the EU delegation’s role at the OSCE, where the EU delegation 
“speaks on behalf of the member states.” “[T]he EU delegation talks, and not the member 
states.” 147 Furthermore, in many cases they “are the only ones participating in informal 
meetings. […] So the EU delegation is together with the American and the Russian delegation 
part of the three key actors in the OSCE.” This gives the EU delegation a unique role in 
informal negotiations, since, as the official argues, “[t]hey are in the room”, often without 
EU member states present, thereby “more effectively than at the Council of Europe and the 
UN, it is represented to the outside in a very unified way”. 148 
 
There is one severe limitation to the EU delegation’s capacity to act during the deputies’ 
meeting. Even if the EU delegation in Vienna is often speaking on the behalf of the EU 
member states, just as in Strasbourg, they are not able to participate in spontaneous debate. If 
“the EU doesn’t have a clear line, the EU delegation cannot respond. […] [S]ometimes a 
member state will take the floor”, but “often then we don’t respond at all.”149 
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One national delegation expresses deep regrets over this since “we would like to see that the 
EU delegation jumped into the discussion because we think that they have a mandate […] but 
they don’t really dare to […] because they know that it could be turned against them […] so 
they probably think that it is better to keep to what has been agreed.”150 This analysis is 
shared by the EU official, who underlines that “the EU will of course make sure that what 
they are doing is in line with the mandate they got from the member states. Because member 
states would make it very clear if they thought that they over-stepped its mandate.” The 
official agrees that it “is a clear restraint on our ability to act or carry out foreign policy”, 
but then, “that is a political question. Do you want to give the EU more leeway? There are 
member states who do, there are those who think it must remain a member state policy.”151 
 
Even though the EU role has been much more institutionalized in Vienna, the static form of 
participation and the inability to engage in spontaneous debate is a common institutional 
limitation in Strasbourg and Vienna. 
5.2.2!The!strong!‘local!factor’!at!the!Council!of!Europe!
The local factor here refers to specific factors at the Council of Europe or the OSCE that 
affects the role conceptions, factors that are not transferable to other contexts. The EU 
delegation’s role at the deputies’ meeting is much more limited in Strasbourg than in Vienna. 
Several interviewees point to the organisational structure and composition of the Council of 
Europe as a reason for this: 
 
“I think that it differs from the EU at other multilateral organisations, given the nature of the 
Council of Europe. That the EU has, almost have, effectively an automatic majority. So […] it 
wouldn’t be beneficial either to the members of the EU or the Council of Europe, if the EU 
was to be seen to act on block in the same way as in the OSCE, for example.” 152 
 
This is being re-iterated by several national representatives in Strasbourg. 153  One 
representative underlines that the Council of Europe is a “norm-based organisation […] built 
on peer pressure“, and that “if the EU would go into the debate [about the execution of the 
European Court of Human Rights judgements], then this organisation would loose its raison 
                                                
150"Interviewee"n°"1."
151"Inteviewee"n°"6."
152"Interviewee"n°"2."
153"Interviewees"n°"2,"4,"5."
 45 
d’être.”154 Another respondent claims that it “would de-motivate non-EU members to be vocal 
and active participants.”155 But as one interviewee said with reference to the limited role of 
the EU delegation: “I don’t think it is necessarily a limitation. And it is because of the 
particular nature of the Council of Europe that I mentioned.”156 In other words, the EU “has 
to be visible but not over-bearing” at the Council of Europe.157 
 
An EEAS official confirms this pattern, adding that “[b]asically I think that the member state 
delegations here are often quite detached from their roles in Brussels. So we encounter this 
very much that the member states here are not aware of what has been agreed on for example 
on the EU level in Brussels. [T]he local flavour is important and you have to […] give [the 
Council of Europe] importance if you represent your country here in Strasbourg. At the same 
time, you have to do this being fully aware of your entire national position, which include to a 
hundred per cent extent, the EU agreed position. And this is not working quite so well.”158 
 
The perfect demonstration of this position is the UK delegation, as cited earlier in the text. 
The UK does not agree to coordination or that the EU should speak with one voice. Thereby, 
even if the Lisbon Treaty and the European Security Strategy impose the obligation to 
coordinate in multilateral fora, and reinforce the EU common foreign policy, there are still 
member states that are reluctant to employ this policy.  
 
The argument that we should not act as EU countries in this context is to some extent echoed 
in Vienna. One national representative claims that “there are countries that think that, 
Brussels is one thing, and the OSCE is another.” The respondents refer to group dynamics, 
arguing that the mere presence of Russia and Ukraine in the room affects the internal EU 
debate. “In Brussels the member states discuss […] in a vacuum, whereas in Vienna […] the 
multilateral context is much more present. [Y]ou are defining your policy […] more in a 
direct relation to what others do.”159 This last comment is in direct relation to Russia. It is 
one thing to decide on sanctions towards Russia in the realms of the European Council in 
Brussels, another thing to discuss the Ukraine issue with Russia in the room. This has been 
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the largest divide between the EU member states during the Ukraine crisis, namely how to 
treat Russia.160 According to the respondents, some member states push for a harder line 
towards Russia, trying to impose EU language into the decisions in Strasbourg or Vienna, 
whereas others emphasize the importance of maintaining a dialogue with Russia, since, as one 
interviewee in Strasbourg says: “There are not many other occasions where we have the 
opportunity to discuss human right’s issues with the Russians!”161 The importance of keeping 
a dialogue with Russia is emphasized also by those member states that normally push for a 
hard line towards Russia. 
 
When asked how this has affected the EU position on Ukraine, some say that it has lead to 
watered-down positions at some occasions,162 but that when it comes down to it, the member 
states stick together.163 The EU “ha[s] managed to keep up the Brussels position, there have 
been no local ‘inventions’”.164 A national representative in Strasbourg underlines that “this 
factor could be very strong or it could be minimal. And the EU delegation’s role is to make 
sure that the factor is balanced. […] I think that the EU delegation has managed very 
well.”165  
5.2.2!a!Home!desks!of!the!member!states!
Several interviewees have pointed to the member state home desk structure as a contributing 
reason for the local “flavour”. 166 “It depends a lot on where the ‘home desks’ are placed. If 
they are on the human rights units in the capitals, the focus is very different from if it is on the 
politico-security policy desk.”167 An EU official emphasizes that “usually the people who 
deal with the Council of Europe have never dealt with European issues […] before. […] I 
think that it makes sense in terms of how people think.”168 
5.2.3!Big!and!small!member!states!
Some respondents, when reasoning about the “local factor”, have claimed that even though 
there is a local factor, it is not the key factor. Instead, according to them, it goes back to how 
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the member state sees the Lisbon Treaty and the EU cooperation in general.169 “[I]t contains 
elements from both, but I think that, mostly the second one.”170 “[I]t is very much attached to 
the extent to which CFSP – a common EU Foreign Policy – is important to [a country]. So, 
for Ireland it is vital, because we are tiny, we do not really have any influence, except 
influencing the CFSP, whereas Germany, France…”171  
 
All the respondents that participated in the study have in fact pointed to the small versus big 
member state aspect, when discussing the roles that the member states take and the differing 
perceptions of the EU delegation’s role. “For […] smaller member states in particular for 
whom a common foreign policy position among the states is a priority, then the EU is very 
important. […] For […] the larger member states that pursue their own policy agendas, it is 
less important. And you can see that here with the UK, the Germans, the French, the Italians 
to an extent.”172 “The big countries take their liberties to not really, wanting to coordinate. 
And add some or retract some, adjust it a little bit […] either above or below the EU 
position.”173 It was also directly demonstrated by the position taken by the UK delegation in 
Strasbourg. In other words, big member states can afford not to coordinate. In Vienna, on the 
contrary, an EEAS official claimed that “[the member states] are very disciplined and also 
the French and UK. If you get the UK at the UN for example they are much more of a difficult 
member state. It is not like this in Vienna. I don’t know if it is […] just a tradition that 
member states are used to have this coordination for a longer time, they are more accepting 
it”. 174 
 
Although the sample is not enough in order to make generalizations, this explorative effort 
has managed to generate some interesting findings in this respect that should be explored 
further in the context of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
5.2.4!Importance!of!personal!leadership!
Several interviewees have pointed to personal qualities as an important factor shaping the EU 
delegation’s role. Respondent n° 1 claims that personal preferences can affect the outcome: 
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“A strong head of the EU delegation can, so to speak interpret the Lisbon Treaty and do as 
much as you can with the Lisbon Treaty and expand it and reinforce it.”175 
 
In Strasbourg, the EU ambassador changed during the Ukraine crisis, from a “bureaucrat from 
the Commission” to a “representative from the member state”, something that according to 
several respondents has lead to enhanced leadership. One interviewee describe the 
development of the role of the EU delegation during the crisis: 
 
“I would say that they have been very cautious initially, and this was because of the previous 
EU ambassador, [name] was too weak to take on this problem. And [she/he] didn’t have that 
background, so no one could demand that from (her/him). I mean, [she/he] comes from the 
Commission and works mainly with projects, and all of a sudden we have a politico-security 
crisis in Europe and then well… the person now in place has experience of government 
negotiations, [she/he] has a political intuition.”176  
 
On the other hand, the phenomenon described could be linked to the institutional context. 
Interviewee n° 4 continues:  
 
“[I]n general, the Commission is not so good… they are not used to represent states and be 
in there and have that political intuition. And that is the biggest difference, I think, between 
diplomats from the capitals and those from Brussels.” 
 
This could be connected to the quote from interviewee n° 8 above, stating that the 
institutional environment affect people’s mind-set and how they reflect on different matters. 
So rather than it being a personal quality, it could be linked to the institutional knowledge and 
experience of the person. 
5.2.5!EEAS!–!a!new!institution!
Several respondents in Strasbourg pointed to the fact that the EEAS is a relatively new 
institution and that the EU delegation in Strasbourg has not been in place for a very long time. 
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“I mean the EU delegation doesn’t have a long history here. And I think they are still trying 
to work out what their role is, and that we are all trying to work out what their role is.”177 
 
The role is not completely established formally within the Council of Europe, nor is it 
consolidated informally among the member states.  
 
“[I]t is getting better and better and better, the EU in Strasbourg is becoming a much more 
important player where it is taken much more into account. […] And it depends on very 
pragmatic and practical, but also very theoretical factors. The practical factors being that in 
order to make the EU delegation and thus the EU influential and present here, you have to 
have the people. […] On the other side in the more of theoretical realm I think it also has to 
do a lot with how the Council of Europe sees its relationship with the EU in general. I mean, 
the more we get the point across to the Council of Europe sees that we are an important 
player and an important partner that has to be taken into account and respected on all sorts 
of levels by the Council of Europe the more the Council of Europe influence will be attributed 
to the EU delegation itself.“178 
 
In this way, the process of establishing a role is a process where both the EU member states, 
the non-EU participating states at the Council of Europe and the organisation itself 
participate. It is a process over time: 
 
”But over time, we have seen that they weigh in the EU aspect more and more in each 
decision. […] It is the daily procedure that matters, […] that forms a common mind-set and 
reflection. It is a new culture that is developing […] And this effect, I believe that it is a more 
important factor than the treaty itself, that and the day-to-day personal contact.”179 
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5.3!Summarizing!of!roles!and!positioning!!
In the table below I have summarized the role perceptions of the interviewees into to the 
analysis scheme. 
 
Table. Result of role perceptions of the EU delegation /level of Europeanization. 
Roles 
Levels of 
Europeanization 
Role conceptions 
Self-perception (EEAS) Member State role prescriptions 
  
What expectations 
does the EU 
delegation have on 
its own role at the 
OSCE/Council of 
Europe? 
 
 
How do the 
EEAS officials 
perceive the 
EU 
delegation’s 
performance? 
 
What do Member 
states expect from 
the EU 
delegation? (Role 
prescriptions) 
 
How do the 
member states 
perceive the role 
taken by the EU 
(perceived 
performance) 
The EU as the 
newcomer 
 
- Low level of 
Europeanization 
- Absence of 
coherency 
  N° 7  
The EU as the 
coordinator  
 
- Bottom-up 
- Coherency 
 N° 3, 6, 8 N° 2. N° 1, 2, 4, 7, 9. 
The EU as a leader 
 
- High level of 
Europeanization 
- Top-down 
N° 3, 6, 8  N° 1, 4, 5, 9 N° 5 (the EU del 
”is more trying to 
lead”). Possibly 
also n° 4 who 
points to an 
enhanced 
leadership. 
 
The results of the analysis will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. On the 
following page I have inserted another table lining out the respondents positions on potential 
factors to the role conceptions. 
  
!
Table. EU and member state officials’ view on factors affecting the EU delegation’s role performance at the OSCE 
and the Council of Europe.!
 Internal factors External factors 
  
Pointing to 
personal 
leadership 
skills 
(informal) 
 
 
Pointing to big 
versus small 
member states 
as a factor 
 
Pointing to the 
EEAS as a new 
institution as a 
factor 
 
Linking the EU 
delegation’s role to 
the local 
organisational 
structure (formal) 
  
Status of the EU 
delegation 
(formal) 
Relationship 
with the 
OSCE/CoE 
(informal) 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Interviewees n° 
1, 4, 5, 7 
 
Interviewees n° 
1, 2, 4, 7 
 
Interviewees n° 
1, 3, 4, 7, 8 
 
Interviewees n° 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
 
Interviewees n° 
1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8. 
 
Interviewees n° 
4, 8 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Interviewee n° 
2. 
 
Interviewees n° 
6, 9 
  
Interviewees n° 1, 
3, 9 
  
 
Did not 
mention/no 
opinion 
 
Interviewees n° 
3, 6, 8, 9 
 
Interviewees n° 
3, 5, 8 
 
Interviewees n° 
2, 5, 6, 9 
  
Interviewees n° 
3, 4, 9 
 
Interviewees n° 
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 
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6."Conclusive+remarks!
The analysis aimed to explore the role conceptions of the EU delegation in Strasbourg and 
Vienna, and it has indeed shed light over role conceptions and possible factors influencing the 
roles. We have seen that some of the expectations derived from previous literature have been 
confirmed in this study, whereas some new patterns have been revealed. There are differences 
and similarities between Strasbourg and Vienna. I will shortly discuss the results, before 
connecting it to the theoretical concepts. 
 
The role taken by the EU delegation 
The EU delegation seems to have assumed slightly different roles at the Council of Europe 
and the OSCE. In both organisations, most EU member states emphasize the importance of 
staying united as a group and speaking together. The difference is that in Vienna, the EU 
delegation is often speaking on behalf of the EU states and it participates in informal 
negotiations, sometimes as the only representative of the EU states, whereas in Strasbourg the 
role of the EU delegation is very limited during the deputies’ meeting. Consequently, in 
Strasbourg, it is much more important to the member states to speak in their national capacity 
compared to in Vienna, where the EU role has been much more institutionalized. This well 
illustrates the interplay between formal and informal restraints; from a strictly legal point of 
view, the issue of the EU delegation’s legal status is not resolved in Vienna either, however, 
there is a well developed practice within the OSCE that have made the EU delegation in 
principle a participating state. 
 
A consolidation of the EU delegation’s role during the Ukraine crisis? 
According to several member state delegations, however, the EU delegation in Strasbourg has 
stepped up during the Ukraine crisis from being a mere mediator to a more active actor that is 
trying to push for its position and to increasingly lead the member states. The EU official that 
was interviewed pointed to the importance of an extended EU competence in these issues, 
which has allowed the EU delegation to assume a role leaning towards more top-down 
leadership at the Council of Europe. Regardless of any rate, it seems that the member states 
increasingly accept and see the benefits of a common EU policy in both organisations, 
although the practice is much more developed in Vienna compared to Strasbourg. 
Consequently, the acceptance of being steered by the EU delegation is higher in Vienna. 
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According to the respondents, even “difficult” countries such as the United Kingdom are 
accepting the common practice, which is why it is regrettable that it was not possible to 
include them in the sample in order to explore their position closer.  
 
Importance of personal leadership or institutional learning? 
Some respondents refer to the shift of leadership in Strasbourg as a factor to the enhanced 
leadership. Although they point to personal qualities as important for leadership and as a 
prerequisite for an influential EU delegation, when asked more closely about these qualities, 
they often point to their professional background and the difference between coming from the 
European Commission and from a member state ministerial. Regardless of whether this is a 
conscious choice made by the EEAS or not, we could at least argue that it is not primarily the 
personal assets per se, but rather institutional learning that matters in forming role 
performance.  
 
A local factor or just a matter of big versus small member states? 
Likewise, there are different understandings of why member states have different views of the 
role of the EU delegation. While some argue that it is the local organisational context, others 
maintain that the big versus smaller member states factor is more decisive. In Strasbourg, the 
local factor is very present since the EU has almost effectively an automatic majority. 
Because of this, the EU group does not want to be seen to act as a block, and is therefore 
trying to act in a united way, without seeming too united. It is still important for most member 
states to stay united. Those who are critical towards carrying out Brussels conclusions in 
Strasbourg and Vienna are the same that are critical towards the EU position in Brussels; the 
bigger member states want to be seen as international actors in their own capacity. 
 
The finding that big and small member states factor matter is neither new, nor controversial. 
But it is remarkable that even though the EU has found a compromise in Brussels, a position 
that in principle should be implemented in Vienna and Strasbourg, some member states still 
oppose coordination in these fora arguing that the context is another, that the premises are 
different. But, as some interviewees pointed out, maybe this is the role of the EU delegation – 
to weigh in the voices from both big and small member states, member states favourable to 
EU coordination and those who are more reluctant, and all in all, minimize the “local” factor. 
In this way, the EU delegation still seems to have more of a facilitating or moderating role. 
Despite the claims of malfunctioning coordination, many respondents claim that the EU still 
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has managed to keep up a minimum level of common position, even if it has at some points 
been a lowest common denominator. It has been most successful in Vienna, where member 
states have a longer tradition of common practice and are used to coordinate. This might 
indicate that time will have an impact on the role of the EU delegation, and even though time 
does not automatically develop leadership, the direction that the EU delegation has taken and 
the development of their role in Strasbourg during the Ukraine crisis show that the EU 
countries increasingly see the benefits of speaking with one voice and that the EU is 
increasingly taking a leading role and pushing for agendas. And the member states 
increasingly think that they should, even in times of crisis. 
 
Towards a Europeanization of EU politics? 
Connecting the analysis to role theory, several member states attribute the EU delegation an 
important role, although few express the word leader. The small and medium states express 
frustration with the limited performed role of the EU delegation, whereas the big member 
state in the sample expresses frustration over the increasingly influential role of the EU 
delegation in these fora, a pattern that according to the other member states applies to the 
whole EU group. Although it is a very small sample, it corresponds perfectly to the role 
theory expectations: the conflicting role expectations that have developed within the EU 
group pose a problem for the EU delegation in terms of role performance. Likewise, a gap 
between role expectations and perceived performance cause frustration among the member 
states and what is more, it poses possible limitations to the EU delegation’s ability to carry 
out leadership in terms of setting the agenda and pushing for positions. 
 
Connecting then to the concept of Europeanization, we can see that the pattern is more 
complex than simply a higher or lower level of Europeanization. It could not be reduced to a 
linear development. Aggestam (2014) and Verlin Laatikainen (2010) argue that we could 
have a high level of EU leadership without being able to carry out effective foreign policy. I 
argue that we can have a high level of common action, but without a strong leadership from 
the EU delegation. This could be illustrated instead by the concepts of top-down or bottom-up 
leadership as presented by Wong.1 In these terms, what we see today is a higher level of 
Europeanization of EU foreign policy with increased coherency, but the leadership is not only 
top-down but rather, it is the member states that negotiate with the EU delegation as a 
                                                
1"In"Hill"&"Smith"(ed)"(2011)."
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facilitator, moderator. The results of this study indicate a trend towards more top-down 
leadership in the EU group, which has been stronger traditionally in Vienna and re-enforced 
in Strasbourg during the Ukraine crisis. This does not necessarily mean that the Ukraine issue 
itself has facilitated a leading role for the EU delegation in Strasbourg, but at least it shows 
that there has not been a step-down at times of crisis. In the end, it might be that with time, 
the member state delegations simply get used to the EU delegation speaking for them and 
setting the agenda. The cases of the role of the EU delegation at the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe indicate such a development. The EU delegation in Vienna has a much more 
institutionalized role, which arguably has made the EU member states more compliant. At the 
Council of Europe, the EU delegation is newer and does not enjoy the same level of 
institutionalization. Furthermore, they have not had the same traditional practice as at the 
OSCE, where the informal practice of EU coordination goes back to the Helsinki act, which at 
the time of writing this essay celebrates its 40th anniversary. 2 
 
The consolidated role of the EU delegation in Vienna could be a demonstration how the 
socialization process has managed to affect the way in which the member states think about 
foreign policy, creating a “common mind-set and reflexion”. It has even prevented normally 
“difficult” member states such as the UK from deriving too much from the common EU 
position. It is however difficult to establish if this is due to a socialization process or if it 
could rather be explained by a rational institutionalist approach, according to which an 
institution (the EU delegation) is facilitating the collective action dilemma, by affecting the 
range of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing enforced mechanisms that reduce 
the risks of collective action.3 
 
It might be that acceptance of the EU’s role will increase over time, let it be because of a 
socialization process or because the re-enforced CFSP has reduced the options for the 
member states to act unilaterally. This said, it is much up to the EU delegation to assume its 
role and push it in a desirable direction. Heretofore, the EU delegation has not considered a 
leading position suitable at the Council of Europe, but recent development during the Ukraine 
crisis shows that they increasingly take a leading role. With a combination of a pro-active EU 
delegation and increasing acceptance from the member states, this might well produce a 
stronger top-down EU leadership. 
                                                
2"OSCE"5."
3"Hall"&"Taylor"(1996),"p."945."
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Policy implications 
Apart from exploring the complex process of negotiations of roles, this study has also shed 
light over some very practical institutional constraints in the process of producing a common 
EU policy within the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Due to the nature of issues treated at 
the Council of Europe, the home desks of the member countries as well as many 
representatives in Strasbourg are often not well acquainted with EU issues. Consequently, 
many national delegations are somewhat detached from the EU context, and do not assume 
their entire national position, which should include the EU position. The outcome is of course 
different if the instructions come from a human rights expert rather than an officer from the 
foreign ministry. 
 
More importantly, the EU delegation’s status is not the same in Strasbourg as in Vienna, 
which has produced different outcomes in terms of capacity to carry out leadership. Although 
the EU is not a full participating member of the OSCE either, the practice of participation is 
much more enhanced as compared to the Council of Europe, making it, in principle, equal to a 
participating state. The different levels of consolidation of role positions have to do with the 
EU’s relationship with the respective organisations. The issue of the status of the delegation 
in Strasbourg should be solved in order for it to function more efficiently. The introduced 
legal personality of the EU and the on-going negotiations on the EU’s accession to the 
European convention might lead to an enhanced institutionalization of its role at the Council 
of Europe. Risks are that the non-EU member states might be reluctant to this, due to the 
EU’s near majority in the organisation and to the unclear consequences of an EU admission 
for e.g. voting rights at the Committee of Ministers. Consequently, the EU member states as 
well might be reluctant to a too advanced position at the Council of Europe, since they seem 
to be very keen on their relationship with this organisation. 
 
The EU member states might have to discuss on an overall level what implications the Lisbon 
treaty should have on the EU’s engagement in multilateral organisations and the role of the 
EEAS in this context, since it is clear that this is a yet-to-be solved issue. 
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Future research 
The approach to explore role conceptions and leadership through interviews turned out to be 
fruitful. Despite a limited sample, the study managed to shed light over role perceptions and 
role prescriptions, and it suggested factors influencing roles emergence and what implications 
these roles might have for a common EU foreign policy. This is a highly interesting result in a 
field of the foreign policy that has rarely been explored before. In the future, the study should 
be expanded to include a larger sample representing more member states, and a larger 
variation of member states, including so called big member states and also southern member 
states. This could help to further explore and categorize role prescriptions and possible role 
conflicts. The understanding of roles is a crucial first step towards the understanding and 
explaining of the EU as a foreign policy actor in these contexts. The sociological-
institutionalist based assumptions including a wide definition of institutions as informal rules 
and norms has helped us exploring the process of role negotiation, although we could also 
draw on rational institutionalist assumptions on institutions functioning as a restraint on 
member state choices of action. 
 
Since the working hypothesis of this thesis was that role conceptions affect actual 
performance, in a future step, studies should aim to look at actual performance, in order to see 
if/how it corresponds/correlates to the role conceptions. Due to the limited access to relevant 
documents, it might be useful to instead make an observational study in this respect. 
 !
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Appendix!
List!of!Interviews!
Interview n. 1 on the 27th of April, 2015, by phone.   
Interview n. 2 on the 5th of May, 2015, by Skype. 50 minutes. 
Interview n. 3 on the 8th of May, 2015, in Brussels. 25 minutes. 
Interview n. 4 on the 29th of May, 2015, by phone. 30 minutes. 
Interview n. 5 on the 1st of June, 2015, by phone. 25 minutes. 
Interview n. 6 on the 4th of June, by phone. 30 minutes. 
Interview n. 7 on the 9th of June, by phone. 20 minutes. 
Interview n. 8 on the 19th of June, by phone. 25 minutes. 
Interview n. 9 on the 3rd of July, by phone. 30 minutes. 
 
Interview!guide!(English)!
Theme 1: The role of the EU delegation 
 
1) To start with a general question - how would you describe the role of the EU delegation at 
the OSCE/Council of Europe? 
 
2) What do you think that the EU delegation wants to achieve at the OSCE/Council of 
Europe? 
 
3) What role would you say that the EU delegation has taken during the EU coordination 
meetings in regards to the Ukraine crisis? 
! Active role? Passive? Mediating?  
 
Theme 2: The role taken by the member States 
 
4) Are there member States that have been taking the lead in the Ukraine discussions at the 
EU coordination meeting? 
 
5) Are there member States that have taken an active part in coordinating the EU member 
States in regards to the Ukraine crisis? 
 
(Theme 1) 
 
6) How would you describe the role of the EU delegation during the deputies’ meeting? 
 
7) How do you think that the EU member states perceive the participation of the EU 
delegation at the meeting? 
 
(Theme 2) 
 
8) Do you think that it is important for member States to speak in their national capacity 
during the deputies’ meeting? 
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9) How important is it for the member States to show unity towards the non-EU member 
States in the Ukraine question? 
 
Other 
 
10) How would you describe the EU coordination during the Ukraine crisis?  
! Biggest obstruction? 
! Is there a local factor in Vienna/Strasbourg in comparison to Brussels? 
 
11) Would you describe the Ukraine crisis as a “typical case” of EU coordination? Explain. 
 
12) How do you think that the EU member States view their memberships at the EU and 
OSCE/CoE respectively?  
! How does the member state relate to its EU membership when in the context of the 
OSCE/CoE? 
 
13) What is the difference between the OSCE and the Council of Europe?  
! Role during the crisis 
! Related to EU coordination 
 
Interview!guide!(Swedish) 
Tema 1: EU-delegationens roll 
 
1) Hur skulle du beskriva EU-delegationens roll i OSSE? 
 
2) Hur tror du att EU-delegationen ser på sin roll? Vad tror du att de har för mål med sin 
närvaro? 
 
3) Vilken roll tycker du att EU-delegationen har tagit under EU-samordningsmöten under 
Ukrainakrisen? Aktiv/passiv/medlande? 
 
Tema 2: Medlemsstaternas roll 
 
4) Finns det medlemsstater som är tongivande i debatten under EU-samordning? 
 
5) Finns det medlemsstater som tar på sig en stor roll i att koordinera EU-länderna? 
 
(Tema 1) 
 
6) Hur skulle du beskriva EU-delegationens roll under ställföreträdarmötena?  
 
7) Hur ser EU-medlemsstaterna på EU-delegationens deltagande i ställföreträdarmötena? 
 
(Tema 2) 
 
8) Tror du att det är viktigt för medlemsstater att tala i nationell kapacitet? Föredrar MS att 
uttala sig själva under ställföreträdarmöten? 
 
9) Hur viktigt är det för MS att EU visar sig enade utåt? 
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Övrigt 
 
10) Hur har EU-samordningen fungerat överlag under Ukrainakrisen? Möjliga hinder? Lokala 
faktorer? 
 
11) Skulle du beskriva Ukrainakrisen som ett typexempel på hur EU brukar agera/samordna i 
OSSE/Europarådet? 
 
12) Hur tror du att medlemsstaterna ser på sitt EU-medlemskap vs sitt OSSE-medlemskap och 
förpliktelser? 
 
13) Vad är skillnaden mellan OSSE och Europarådet? 
 
